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African American Farmers Tilling For Congressional Attention: Exploring The 
Agenda Status of Agricultural Support Policy And The Hopeful Permeations of 
Civil Rights (1940-1998) 
 
Chaun Stores  
 
As with similar studies of agenda setting, this research builds on the work of Baumgartner and Jones 
(1993), King (1997), Worsham (1997), and Tzoumis (2001). Specifically, the focus of this study is on 
agricultural support policymaking—as it relates to African American farmers. Three fundamental 
objectives serve as the blueprint for the analysis. The first is to understand how Congress governs the 
agenda of agricultural support policy over the post-war period. Second, is to learn whether congressional 
activity is conducive to the interests of African American farmers and, third, is to assess if and when the 
agenda of agricultural support policy ever intersected with that of civil rights. Three qualifiers help 
facilitate and focus the analysis: (1) congressional committees are used as the venue of agenda-setting 
activity (2) bill introductions and (3) congressional hearings are used as the measures of agenda status and 
governmental attention. 
 
The analysis in this dissertation derives from data collected on agricultural-related bills and hearings in 
Congress from 1940-1998. Through the utilization of both bill introductions and congressional hearings, 
general patterns of issue composition, committee competition, policy monopoly, and coalitional activity are 
fundamentally examined. In part, endogenous and exogenous punctuating events are evaluated according to 
the variation in these patterns. 
 
The first chapter introduces the purpose and layout of the study. Chapter Two examines the evolution of 
agricultural policy and the travail it created for African American Farmers. This historical analysis will 
show that by the time New Deal politics produced new public policies, the direction of favoring large 
farmers was set and followed by government (Browne, 2003, 145). An important product of this 
accommodation made to large farming interests was the early arrangement of dominant subsystem politics, 
which consequently influences the direction of agricultural policy well into the late 1960s. Chapter Three 
describes the two perspectives of agenda setting. This chapter not only serves as a conduit to the research 
theory, but it also provides the backdrop for the next two analysis chapters.  
 
Chapters Four and Five illustrate the agenda dynamics of agricultural support policy are influenced by the 
institutional actions of congressional committees/subsystems, policy entrepreneurs, as well as by 
endogenous and exogenous punctuating events. Findings will illustrate that although Agricultural 
Committees may serve as the institutional anchor for subsystem arrangement and policy monopoly, 
punctuating events tend to alter the policy equilibria maintained by such an arrangement. Moreover, such 
events can and do alter policy outputs as well.  
 
Chapter Six of the research details how group pressure at the state and local level aided in bringing forth 
legislative assistance and governmental attention to the problems faced by African American farmers. 
However, due to the limited success and continued complaints of discrimination, African American farmers 
change venue and take their issue to the courts. As such, the later segment of this chapter details the current 
status of the class-action lawsuit brought against the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), and 
how judicial action has yet to equate to institutional redress. Chapter Seven concludes the dissertation by 
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“The achievement of justice is an endless process.” 




In 1997, more than 1,000 African American farmers initiated the Timothy Pigford, et al. 
v. Glickman class action lawsuit, requesting over $2 billion in compensation for 
discrimination by the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) between the 
years 1983 and 1997. The lawsuit alleges that the USDA purposely mishandled and 
denied loan applications and disaster relief to black farmers solely on the basis of race.  
Representative Maxine Waters (D-CA) testified at a congressional hearing on the issue in 
1997 that the USDA has been bogged down with bureaucrats who have routinely 
discriminated against African American farmers (Knight, 2000).  
On January 5th 1999, the USDA sought to settle the lawsuit by agreeing to pay 
$50,000 to every black farmer who could substantiate a claim of discrimination by the 
agency through the denial of government loans/credit as well as disaster relief assistance. 
Unfortunately, many of these farmers had already lost their land, unlike their white 
counterparts. As table 1.1 illustrates, the rate of decline by black farm operators between 










Table 1.1: U.S. Farms Operated by Blacks and Whites, 1900-1997 
 
Year Blacks % Change Whites % Change
1997 18,451 -1.9 1,882,652 -0.9
   
1992 18.816 -18.0 1,900.63 -8.0
1987 22,954 -31.0 2,064,805 -6.5
   
1982 33,250 -41.9 2,207,726 -8
1978 57,271 -57.3 2,398,726 -22.4
   
1969 133,973 -50.8 3,089,885 -9.6
1959 272,541 -51.3 3,419,672 -28.8
1950 559,980 -17.9 4,802,520 -10.7
1940 681,790 -22.8 5,378,913 0.1
1930 882,852 -4.6 5,373,703 -2.3
1920 925,710 3.6 5,499,707 1.1
1910 893,377 19.6 5,440,619 9.5
1900 746,717  4,970,129
   
Overall percentage loss, 
1920-1997  -98.0 -65.8
Source: Spencer Wood and Jess Gilbert, “Returning African American Farmers to the land: Recent trends and policy 
rationale.” Source for 1900-1978: United States Commission on Civil Rights, 1982:3. Sources for 1982-1997: 1992 
Census of Agriculture: Geographic Series 1B, CD-ROM and 1997 Census of Agriculture: Geographic Series 1B. 
 
 
In an effort to understand how the problems faced by African American farmers 
are linked to the actions of government, it is important to examine the agenda in which 
policies were initiated and created. William Browne (2003, 130) argues that government 
exacerbates the existence of discrimination when “it creates policies to keep certain types 
of farmers in business, while ignoring farmers characteristic of a certain race.” Gilbert 
and Eli (2000, 149) emphasize that since land ownership had historically been an issue of 
racial tension in the South, most white congressmen in the House and the Senate were 
antagonistic when it came to initiating and supporting policies intended to provide 




agriculture for black farmers became more difficult when government sought to 
modernize and develop the farm sector. After the late 1940s, when industrialization was 
impacting agriculture, agricultural policy was the epitome of pluralism in which various 
groups and interests were readily accommodated (Sheingate, 2001; Hansen, 1991; 
Browne, 1988).  This may very well be the case; however, if the interests of African 
American farmers were routinely excluded during the agenda setting of agricultural 
policy, the extent of pluralism can be questioned. As such, taking a closer look at post-
New Deal agricultural policy is important to understanding the challenges faced by black 
farmers.  
The historic agenda of agriculture focused on increased production, competitive 
markets, and the option for individual farmers to profit from such circumstances. Once 
the Great Depression hit, it was transformed to one of relief, recovery, and reform 
(Paarlberg 1989, 41). Government intervention was utilized to establish and maintain 
farm stability primarily among large farm producers. As a result, the dilemma faced by 
small farmers was to avoid displacement, while striving for a piece of prosperity. The 
road traveled by African American farmers came with far more struggles and turmoil. As 
African Americans moved from slave to freedmen, expectations of acquiring land and 
living as a free independent farmer was full of disappointment and episodic despair. In 
part, the issue of race placed African American farmers outside the social order by which 
government is inherently influenced.1 Under such circumstances, race along with their 
inability to influence policy makers, precluded this group of farmers from having their 
                                                 
1 Assertion taken from Rogers M. Smith 1997 Civic Ideals pp 41 in which he details how race prohibited 




immediate and long term needs immediate and long term needs addressed by 
government. 
In government’s attempt to address an issue, perceptions of the problem are 
debated and the level of attention it receives may be indefinite. Groups and actors within 
and outside of government actively work to have policy fit their needs. In such an attempt 
there are bound to be winners and losers. Subsequently, the focus of my research explores 
(1) how Congress manages the agenda of agricultural support policy over the postwar 
period, (2) whether such management was conducive to the interests of African American 
farmers, and (3) if the agenda of such policy ever intersected with that of civil rights. 
This research examines the agenda of agricultural support policy and whether 
such policy was ever defined in the context of civil rights. A central concern is to explore 
how Congress governs the agenda of agricultural support policy over the post-war era. 
The interest in this question is to analyze the institutional factors that influenced the 
agenda of agricultural support policy of special concern to African American farmers. 
Second, posing this question is important because it forces one to explore the linkage 
between racial equality and public policy as it relates to aspects of agenda setting. Thus, 
the question is worth answering because it reveals the discrepancy between policy, its 
development, and subsequent implementation. 
The implementation or effectiveness of agricultural policy aimed at assisting 
farmers is not assessed, but rather I explore congressional agenda setting and its 
interrelationship with the minority farming community. In doing so, my research 
accomplishes three fundamental goals. First, it examines agricultural policy in the 




agricultural support policy primarily reflected the interests of large landowners or 
agribusiness. Last, it explores if, when, and how the interests of African American 
farmers entered the process. 
In hopes of meeting these objectives, the research is structured according to six 
areas of discussion and analysis. In Chapter Two, I begin my exploration by examining 
the period from Reconstruction leading up to the New Deal. This discussion highlights 
the efforts made to aid black agriculture and the resultant backlash. The next section 
examines post-New Deal activities and decisions of government in the realm of 
agriculture, and the influential political actors and beneficiaries responsible for its 
development. This section illustrates how the development and change in agricultural 
policy was influenced by numerous political groups and or actors. Equally important, it 
highlights the ramifications of agricultural policy being influenced and shaped by deep 
core beliefs held by select interests, thus in turn allowing for negative externalities to be 
shouldered primarily by less influential interests. Moreover, Chapter Two is significant 
because it seeks to accentuate the research question and its overall contribution. 
Chapter Three begins by describing the two perspectives to agenda setting. This 
discussion serves as a conduit to developing the research theory; which is explicitly 
presented in the later portion of the chapter. Providing this discussion highlights the 
systems/meso-level framework of the study. Chapters Four and Five illustrate how 
agenda dynamics in agriculture are influenced by the institutional actions of 
congressional committees/subsystems, policy entrepreneurs, as well as by endogenous 




Particularly, Chapter Four tracks the agenda status of agricultural policy and civil 
rights by focusing on legislative bill introductions. Serving as the segue into Chapter 
Five, this discussion examines and compares the level of attention that both the House 
and Senate give to agricultural support policy and civil rights issues. In addition, this 
chapter tracks the referral of agricultural bill introductions and the activity of policy 
entrepreneurs. The purpose of this analysis is to explore policy jurisdiction, as well as the 
instances in which civil rights is introduced within agriculture, and the policy 
entrepreneurs responsible for such coupling. 
Chapter Five expands on the importance of committee turf by detailing how the 
policy monopoly held by the Agriculture Committees can serve to restrict the variety of 
interests involved in policymaking. Agricultural Committees may serve as the 
institutional anchor for subsystem arrangement and policy monopoly, but punctuating 
events can and do alter the equilibria established by such an arrangement. Moreover, not 
only can equilibria be disrupted, but such events can and do alter policy outputs as well. 
As a result, the potential for policy coupling is strengthened but not infallible. Finally, 
Chapter Six discusses how group pressure at the state and local level contributed in 
bringing forth assistance and attention to the problems faced by black farmers. This 
chapter closes by describing the current status of the court settlement between the United 
States Department of Agriculture (USDA) and African American farmers, and how 
judicial action has been indefinite in instituting redress for the many years of 
discrimination. Chapter Seven highlights how my research contributes to the 
understanding of agenda setting as it relates to agricultural policy and African American 










“The freedmen had got the impression that the abandoned  
lands of their old owners were to be divided amongst them. Their 
impressions arose from the talk they had heard around them by the 
white and colored soldiers.” 
-Elizabeth Hyde Botume (1893, 170) 
 
Racial discrimination and inequality involving African American farmers has a long 
history, dating as far back as 1863 with the Emancipation Proclamation. The passage of 
the Proclamation granted nearly 4 million slaves freedom; but it did not guarantee nor 
define their role as a laboring force in the South. In January of 1865 General William T. 
Sherman’s Field Order #15 deeded almost a half-million acres of land to black families in 
Georgia, South Carolina and on the Florida coasts (Magdol 1977, 139). In an effort to 
limit the overwhelming backlash from white southerners, Congress decided not to 
confirm Sherman’s grant, and instead enacted The Freedmen’s Bureau bill. The bill 
included a compromise offer to lease abandoned land to freedmen with the option to 
purchase the land with their profits at low prices within three years (Smith 1997, 300; 
Magdol 1977, 139).  
The quest to pass the bill and to permanently establish The Freedmen’s Bureau 
pitted Congress—who sought to exercise its influence on behalf of freed blacks, against 
the antagonist efforts of President Andrew Johnson (Smith 1997, 301-302). President 




and it sought to do more for Negroes than had ever been done for whites” (Franklin 1947, 
300). Congress’ attempt to over-ride the veto failed. On April 9, 1866 when a determined 
Congress over-rode President Johnson’s veto of the Civil Rights bill, The Freedmen’s 
Bureau was finally placed on solid ground. As Rogers Smith (1997, 290) describes, 
Congressional Reconstruction in 1867 was not as radical as had been anticipated, 
particularly in regards to land redistribution. It did however, provide some succor to 
freedmen. By 1870 The Freedmen’s Bureau was leasing small plots of land abandoned 
during the Civil War to freedmen throughout the South (Franklin 1947, 303).  
In 1877 Rutherford B. Hays removed federal troops from the South in return for 
support from Democratic Southern Congressmen. Du Bois (1935, 692) argues that the 
removal of troops allowed planter-capitalists to control South Carolina and Louisiana—
thus granting Southern landholders and capitalists complete control of disfranchised 
black labor. The removal of federal troops signaled the end of Reconstruction, and as a 
result progress in establishing independent farming for freedmen was severely hampered 
(Reynolds 2002, 3). Failed Reconstruction was a turn for the worse for black labor 
because without the federal government actively assisting freedmen to establish 
economic independence, their ability to purchase land and work as an independent farmer 
was abated (Hurt 1994, 167). Magdol (1977, 197) argues that Reconstruction failed 
freedmen in large part because proponents were unable to revolutionize landownership. 
To buttress this point, Marshall (1971, 57) and Higgs (1977, 78) assert that Congress’ 
inability and unwillingness to implement a major land settlement program was a lost 
opportunity to establish freedmen as independent farmers. Acquiring land and purchasing 




freedmen had neither. As a result, most black farmers were forced into sharecropping and 
tenant arrangements, which subjected them to excruciating poverty and perpetual debt 
(Hurt 1994, 167).2 Consequently, by the late 1880s, approximately 90% of all black 
farmers were forced into sharecropping (Gilbert and Eli 2000, 31). 
Even though governmental action to assist freedmen was thwarted due to 
institutional political wrangling, black farmers sought to rise out of their proletarian 
status through the working of cooperation and collective action (Magdol 1977, 197). In 
1877, a group of white farmers came together on a farm in Texas to form the first 
“Farmers Alliance” (Zinn 1997, 207). “By 1886, 100,000 farmers had joined in two 
thousand suballiances. They began to offer alternatives to the old system: join the 
Alliance and form cooperatives; buy things together and get lower prices. They began 
putting their cotton together and selling it cooperatively—they called it bulking” (Zinn 
1997, 207).  
By the mid 1870s, black farmers came together in the South to form the Colored 
Farmers National Alliance Cooperative Union (CFNACU) (Reynolds, 2002). The 
CFNACU was a segregated branch of the Farmers Alliance, which comprised 
approximately one million members (Zinn 1997, 211). The movement by CFNACU also 
sought to establish greater self-sufficiency by developing strategies of operation on a cash 
basis, as opposed to the widely held crop-lien system. CFNACU worked to provide 
supplies and loans to help members purchase equipment and pay land mortgages 
                                                 
2 Sharecroppers were farmers who worked in the field of the owner and were paid a “share” of the crop 
they harvested. Tenant farmers were farmers who paid an annual cash rent to the owner and kept the 
proceeds of whatever was harvested. Tenant arrangements were preferred because black farmers had more 
discretion over the number of hours worked within the day. (For further discussion see Charlene Gilbert 




(Reynolds 2002, 5).3  As Zinn (1997, 210) explains, black and white Alliance farmers 
were in two different situations. Blacks were primarily field hands and hired laborers; 
while white Alliance members were farm owners. Therefore when the CFNACU declared 
a general cotton harvest strike in 1891 for a dollar a day wages for cotton pickers, 
Leonidas Polk, head of the Southern Alliance, denounced it as hurting the Alliance 
farmer who would have to pay that wage (Zinn 1997, 210). This type of activism 
increased divisiveness between the CFNACU and the Southern Alliance. The CFNACU 
movement was further weakened when it united with the Populist Party; which later 
dissolved after losses in the elections of 1892 and 1896 (Reynolds 2002, 6).  
Other efforts to aid black agriculture came in 1890 in the form of agricultural 
education. Debra Reid (2003, 261) states, “it took nearly thirty years before the United 
States Department of Agriculture (USDA) responded to African American petitioners 
seeking access to public agricultural colleges and experiment stations and the right to 
participate in other USDA programs.”4 In 1890, Congress passed the Second Morrill Act, 
which permitted states to establish separate institutions of higher education to African 
Americans seeking education in agriculture, trades, and household economy (Reid 2003, 
261; McDowell 2001). However, 1890 institutions were only effective when provided 
federal funds for support were fairly and equitably distributed between them and the 
exclusively white 1862 institutions. Hurt (1994, 194) argues that 1890 institutions were 
demonstrably inadequate and incapable of assisting black farmers due to their lack of 
institutional funding.  
                                                 
3 The resources, size, and operations of the CFNACU have not been documented—an historian is currently 
researching detailed information on the CFNACU. 
4 Debra Reid’s assertion of 30 years is in reference to the passing of the first Morrill Act of 1862 and the 




During the same year in 1890 with the passage of the Second Morrill Act, the 
USDA was also granted cabinet status from its establishment in1862.  At its creation in 
1862, the USDA was basically involved in collecting and disseminating information on 
new methods of increasing agrarian production (Brown, 2003). In providing insight into 
new forms of production, the USDA inherently embraced the importance of science and 
technical development as methods to bolster the farming sector. As such, Browne (2003, 
134) explains that modern development, science, and new approaches to better 
production was primarily important to those who were crop diverse and committed to 
reorganizing to enter a market driven economy. Under such circumstances and given the 
current status of land ownership for black farmers, white landowners were in a far better 
position to take advantage of the services offered by the USDA.  
Gilbert and Eli (2000, 149) argue that the USDA’s affiliation with land grants and 
the funding of agricultural colleges/state universities inherently brought the agency into 
the political arena. Given that land ownership was an issue of racial tension in the South 
and the fact that most white congressmen in the House and Senate were inimical when it 
came to initiating and supporting policies intended to provide landownership to black 
farmers, the USDA became a vehicle for accommodating white profit producing farmers 
(Du Bois, 1935). Thus, when whites in Congress insisted that any bills related to 
landownership be worded in a way that would not benefit black farmers, the USDA 
expressed no objection—and from this point on the USDA remained an institutional 
participant in the gradual decline of black farmers (Gilbert and Eli 2000, 149). White 
landowners, the USDA, and southern congressmen had formed a cozy relationship that 




The early relationship that had emerged between the Agriculture Committees, the 
USDA, and the interests of large, white landowners was the early development of a 
“dominant” subsystem arrangement. Worsham (1997, 3) argues that members of select 
congressional committees, bureaucratic personnel, and interest groups affected by a 
policy in question, can form a dominant arrangement and consequently shape policy in 
manner that favors their interests.5 The relationship that was evolving between the 
USDA, large landowners, and southern congressional members of the Agricultural 
Committees was characteristic of “exclusionary politics.” McCool (1998, 560) contends 
that exclusionary politics emerge when subsystem participants can effectively and 
consistently exclude their opponents from active policymaking. Under such an 
arrangement, the subsystem enjoys unparalleled control and influence over the structure 
and future of a policy in question. Unfortunately, this early arrangement limited the 
possibilities that black farmers would achieve land ownership and the resources 
necessary to maintain it.   
By January of 1914, factions developed in Congress when the issue of race 
emerged in the debate over the extension bill. Northern farm-state Republicans sought to 
secure language that would ensure fair distribution of the funds to black land-grant 
colleges; while southern Democrats resisted the inclusion of a racial fairness mandate—
particularly southern Democrats insisted on the states’ authority to decide the issue 
(Sanders 1999, 334). Southern Democrats proved victorious when Senator Ellison Smith 
(R-SC) arranged to have the provision given up in conference, thus leaving the bill’s 
funds to be distributed as the state legislatures directed (Sanders 1999, 334). The 
                                                 




conference bill was later approved and signed by the President Woodrow Wilson in May 
of 1914 (Sanders 1999, 335). After 1914, the USDA’s Extension Service, which now 
operated through state extension services, provided informal education on agriculture to 
rural residents. Unsuitably, African American farmers received minimal information and 
assistance due to underpaid, overworked extension agents segregated at 1890 institutions 
(Reid 2003, 262). Huffman (1981) suggests that the quantity and quality of farmers’ 
extension service was a primary source for the differential productivity on black and 
white farms. Not only did black farmers have to contend with the paucities of extension 
service, but the emergence of the Great Depression only made matters worse.  
 
The New Deal And Its Soiled Agricultural Adjustment Administration 
 
The period of the late 1920s and 1930s was a difficult juncture in agriculture. The slow 
emergence of mechanization, economic depression, and the decline in major commodity 
prices proved problematic for many farmers, particularly for black farmers (Reynolds 
2002, 8). As a result, many agriculture interests found themselves scrambling for 
assistance, but within the pandemonium for relief and influence, particular interests were 
accommodated while others became displaced losers.   
The onset of the Great Depression in 1929 triggered an interventionist role of 
government in the realm of agriculture. President Franklin Delano Roosevelt sought to 
address the downturn in agriculture through the creation of the New Deal’s Agricultural 
Adjustment Administration (AAA). The AAA did not seek to help the poorest of farmers 




288, 285). 6 A major way the AAA attempted to organize agriculture was through the 
utilization of its crop reduction program. Under the reduction program, farmers were 
provided cash benefits for plowing under a designated portion of their cotton, wheat, and 
grain crops and for slaughtering their hogs (Franklin1947, 523). 
 The AAA’s crop reduction program was detrimental to black farmers in two 
profound ways. One, reducing the amount of crop harvested meant that sharecroppers and 
tenants were no longer as beneficial to the farm owner as they were prior to the 
depression—thus the majority of black farmers were forced to move from one town to 
another in search of work (Reynolds 2002, 8; Hurt 1994, 297). Moreover, while owners’ 
cash benefits increased to thousands of dollars under the AAA, many of the grants 
intended for black farmers were misappropriated (Franklin 1947, 523). Many landlords 
took advantage of illiterate sharecroppers and tenants by simply keeping their checks and 
later removing them from their land (Franklin 1947, 523; Hurt 1994, 297). 
 The second detriment of the AAA’s program involved the issue of farm size. The 
scant number of black farmers who had acquired land through efforts of the CFNACU, 
could not participate in the program because their land was not large enough to have a 
portion of it plowed under. Brown and Christy (1994) suggest that support payment 
policies were disadvantageous to small-scale farmers because having to set land aside 
would no longer allow such farmers to have a profitable unit. Ingolf Vogeler (1984, 84) 
argues that without an adequately sized farm, capitalism forces small-scale farmers out of 
business at the benefit of agriculturalists operating on a larger scale. In essence, black 
farmers received nothing more from the AAA other than hardship and disappointment. 
                                                 
6 As defined by the USDA Agricultural Statistics Services, the cutoff between large and small farms is 
$250,000 in gross annual sales. Farms that gross less than this figure are defined “small” farms, while those 




James C. Cobb (1992, 191) indicates that the complaints by black tenants concerning 
AAA abuses in the Mississippi Delta is a clear illustration of their disappointment and 
frustration. 
Numerous official tenant complaints about AAA abuses either fell into a 
bureaucratic black hole or found their way back to county committees whose 
planter membership quickly saw to it that neither rental contracts nor federal 
assistance was available to those who had filed them. Such consequences were 
profound indeed in a region where more than 90 percent of the tenants were 




As 1937 approached, African American farmers experienced a ray of hope. 
Moved by the plight of the agricultural poor, Secretary of Agriculture, Henry A. Wallace 
established and chaired a special committee on Farm Tenancy. Through his efforts, 
Congress passed the Bankhead Jones Farm Tenant Act of 1937 (Culver and Hyde 2000, 
169-171). This Act authorized the government to provide long-term, low interest loans to 
tenant farmers for the purchase of land and farm equipment. Wallace reorganized the 
unsuccessful Resettlement Administration (RA) and created the Farm Security 
Administration (FSA) within the USDA to implement the Act (Brown 2003, 140). 
Franklin (1947, 524) explains that after 1942, appropriations to the FSA were drastically 
cut, and as a result aid to black farmers by the agency was quickly abbreviated. 
Following three years without funding, the FSA was closed in 1946 (Browne 2003, 141). 
Brown (2003) suggests congressional opposition was the fundamental reason for 
the demise of the FSA. Congress and select interests felt the FSA was not effectively and 




development, and technological adoption.7 More importantly, “those who held these 
expectations also held prominent positions within the dominant and conservative agrarian 
development factions within Congress and the USDA, in the Extension Service, and as 
allied leaders of the Farm Bureau” (141). In part, the American Farm Bureau Federation 
(AFBF) used its entrenched local administrative network and vehemently campaigned for 
the abolition of the redistributive effort of the FSA. The AFBF’s adversaries—The 
Grange and The Farmers’ Union railed against such action, but to no avail, their efforts 
proved unsuccessful (Sanders 1999, 417).8 Browne (2003) suggests the dominant 
subsystem arrangement that was developed against the FSA, allied Farmers Union, and 
urban liberal congressmen ultimately proved problematic for black farmers who longed 
for Congress’ attention in addressing their needs. Reminiscent of the relationship that had 
formed in the early 1890s—the FSA, congressional Agriculture Committees, and the 
AFBF had institutionally solidified their gatekeeping arrangement and were once again 
exercising exclusionary politics. 
 
Agricultural Policy (Post-New Deal) 1945-1960 
The decade of the 1940s and into the 1950s found farmers experiencing a wave of 
prosperity. Farmers were able to reap large profits from wartime prices; and as a result 
were able to utilize their profit to acquire more land, equipment, and pay off debts.  The 
rise of more financially secure, federally protected farming in the mid-1950s resulted in 
                                                 
7 Adell Brown and Ralph Christy. 1994. Structural Changes in U.S. Agriculture, Implications for Black 
Farmers. Review of Black Political Economy illustrate that large profit producing farms were indicative of 
those embraced by most conservative members of Congress.   
8 Although not as resourceful as the AFBF, The Grange and The Farmers’ Union were at the time two 
relatively prominent groups that represented the interests of white, small family farmers. Considering that 




significant changes in agriculture and agricultural policy. Hurt (1994, 327) suggests that 
mechanization along with the improvement of hybrid seeds and livestock helped boost 
agriculture productivity by 11 %. However, the use of science and technology 
significantly increased operating costs as well, which in turn kept farmers in a cost-price 
dilemma.   
Farmers and influential agricultural interests such as the American Farm Bureau 
Federation, The National Farmer’s Union (NFU), and The Grange all turned to the 
federal government for price support and marketing aid to help guarantee parity income 
with other American industries (Hurt 1994).9 The federal government answered the call 
to increase farm income by providing credit to “farmers who it judged had the best 
chance to succeed,” or the most economically viable farmers who were able to produce in 
high quantities (Hurt 1994, 327). The result was small farming entities struggling to 
survive in a world conducive to large-scale production units (Spitze, Deray, and West, 
1980). Furthermore, the high cost of modern machinery and the fact that such machinery 
was not functional for small-scale farming, fundamentally limited the competitive 
position of small farmers—particularly African American farmers (Brown and Christy, 
1994, 55). 
Until the mid 1950s agricultural policy was largely based on the Agricultural 
Adjustment Act of 1938.  The Act of 1938 emerged from a conference of farm lobby 
                                                 
9 Price support was a price set by government above free-market level and maintained by governmental 
purchases of excess supply. For a discussion see Robert S. Pindyck and Daniel L. Rubinfeld. 2001. 
Microeconomics. New Jersey. Prentice Hall. pp 302-304. “Parity” was an index of the purchasing power 
of one unit of an agriculture commodity. It represented the price needed to give a bushel of corn or a pound 
of cotton. (For a discussion see Robert L. Tontz, Origin of the base period concept of parity: A significant 
value judgment in agriculture history,” Agricultural History, 32 (January 1958), pp. 3-13—sited from John 
Mark Hansen, Gaining Access Congress and the Farm Lobby, 1919-1981. 1991. pp. 78. Chicago: The 




leaders called by Secretary of Agriculture Henry A. Wallace—which was dominated by 
The Farm Bureau (Hansen 1991, 80).  The primary goal of the Act was a mix of 
mandatory nonrecourse loans and tight production quotas. Hansen (1991, 82) explains 
that the nonrecourse loans and strict production quotas focused on five basic 
commodities—(1) cotton, (2) corn, (3) wheat, (4) tobacco, and (5) rice. The Act 
guaranteed U.S. Treasury payments and Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) loans to 
farmers who maintained their quotas. As such, whenever commodity prices dropped 
below the value of their loans, it allowed growers to reclaim their loans by forfeiting their 
crops to the CCC (hence, for the government, they were “nonrecourse” loans) (Hansen 
1991, 82). Large landowning farmers primarily benefited from the Act’s provision 
because adhering to strict production quotas did not adversely impact their overall level 
of income. Moreover, modern equipment, and improvements in crop materials, enabled 
such farmers to achieve both higher levels of productivity and dramatic savings in 
production (Cobb 1992, 205). 
The Agricultural Acts of 1949, 1954, and 1956, were designed to establish a 
flexible price support plan for basic commodities.  Hansen (1991) suggests that The Farm 
Bureau’s access to the Agriculture Committees was influential in the passage of each Act. 
The AFBF sought to solidify flexible price supports because it removed the federal 
government out of agriculture and favored a free market economy—which was preferred 
by most large-scale farmers.10 Even though the Farm Bureau had solidified access to the 
Agriculture Committees, various groups constantly worked to shape agricultural policy 
                                                 
10 In utilizing flexible price supports large farmers could more readily adjust their output and income 
according to fluctuations in the market. Small farmers preferred and benefited from high price supports 
because it offset their limited farm capacity to produce in large volumes. (See Pyndyck and Rubinfeld, 




according to their interests.  Particularly, the National Farmers’ Union pushed for 
government intervention by advocating high price supports. Contrary to the AFBF and 
the NFU, specialized commodity groups supported moderate agricultural prices and 
favored neither a laissez-faire nor interventionist government in agriculture (Hurt 1994, 
352).  In part, the dominant party in Congress influenced the opportunity for specified 
groups to shape agricultural policy. After World War II, Democratic-controlled 
congresses and Republican presidents readily disagreed over the direction of agricultural 
policy.  Republican presidents and their congressional allies favored policy that entailed 
flexible price supports and the removal of government from the agricultural arena, while 
the Democratic camp embraced high price supports to accommodate small farms (Hurt 
1994, 353). However for black farmers the issues of land ownership and agricultural 
credit, and farm income were most pressing, and unfortunately at the time such issues 
received little attention. 
The Agriculture Act of 1956 adversely affected black and small farmers via the 
two part Soil Bank Program, which allowed the federal government to rent land from 
farmers to remove it from production.  The Short-Term Acreage Reserve Program 
allowed participating farmers to receive federal payments for reducing their acreage of 
basic crops.  Participating farmers were not allowed to plant other crops on the 
withdrawn acreage.  Under the Conservation Reservation Program the government paid 
farmers to reduce their cultivated acreage, contingent upon placing the land in a long-
term conservation program, thereby also removing it from production. Most acreage 
reduction programs required farmers to a leave a portion of their land idle.  Farmers who 




production of that crop (Kennedy and Viser 1990, 28). Again, black farmers were unable 
to take advantage of such programs because their limited farm size made it arduous to 
increase their income under the programs’ provisions.  
 
Agricultural Policy, 1960-1980: A Changing Political Environment 
 
By 1960 the stronghold of flexible price supports had subsided, and Congress had 
changed its approach in guiding agricultural policy (Orden 2002). In addition to repealing 
flexible price supports, Sheingate (2001) suggests that Congress embraced the idea that 
agricultural policy characteristic of voluntary provisions was a way to relieve tensions 
between political parties, producers, and various commodity users. The congressional 
stance on agricultural policy shifted due in large part to a change towards bipartisan 
politics, the interests of nonrural constituents that Congress sought to accommodate, and 
the prominence of commodity organizations in the representation of agricultural interests 
(Sheingate 2001; Hansen, 1991). Subsequently, the Agriculture Act of 1965 reflected the 
voluntary measures desired by Congress. Along with establishing price supports near 
world market levels, the 1965 Act also allowed for voluntary acreage controls for feed 
grains, wheat, and cotton (Hurt 1994, 355). These voluntary acreage measures allowed 
producers to set aside “additional” land for an extra payment. Sheingate (2001, 144) 
argues that voluntary programs aimed at individual commodities helped lessen partisan 
conflict during the development of agricultural policy.  
Although partisan conflicts over agricultural policy decreased during this time, 
several allegations by black farmers claiming discrimination by local USDA offices 




Clifford Hardin sought to make public amends by issuing memorandum number. 1662, 
which required each USDA agency to implement Public Notification Plans (PNP). These 
PNPs required agencies to inform minorities of the availability of all USDA programs 
and to ensure that their participation in such programs were free of discrimination.11 And 
while it was promising for black farmers to recognize the secretary’s call for fairness, 
only time would tell whether the USDA would adhere to Hardin’s requests. 
As agricultural policy unfolded in the 1970s, the political environment in 
Congress changed due to the lessening of dominant subsystem politics (Sheingate 2001; 
Hurt 1994; Baumgartner and Jones, 1993; Hansen 1991; Browne 1988). Congressional 
reforms from 1971-1977 centralized authority within Congress, and thus weakened the 
autonomy and influence maintained by individual committees. Browne (1988) and 
Sheingate (2001) suggest that congressional reforms helped usher in numerous urban and 
suburban members of Congress and as a result, the structure of farm policy represented 
interests beyond the scope of farmers.  As such, in 1973 Congress passed the Agriculture 
and Consumer Protection Act. A major provision of this legislation replaced the concept 
of price supports with deficiency payments in the event that commodity prices fell below 
a particular target price. Although the title of the new Act may indicate otherwise, 
consumer advocates remained on the sidelines during the passage of the bill. The 
collaborative efforts of the Senate Agriculture Committee and farm state Republican 
senator Milton Young (ND) were primarily responsible for bringing forth the bill 
(Hansen 1991, 193).   
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As the 1980s emerged, the effects of a farm crisis adversely impacted the farming 
community. To address the slumping conditions in agriculture, President Ronald Reagan 
and Secretary of Agriculture John Block decreased price-support payments through the 
passage of the Agriculture and Food Act of 1981. This piece of legislation reduced 
agricultural spending and adjusted payments to $50,000 per year for farmers who 
participated in government agricultural programs.  It did not address the problem of 
overproduction, low prices, and high government costs—and consequently, farmers 
continued to experience hard times under the crisis. Congress responded to these issues 
with the Food Security Act (FSA) of 1985, which set maximum and minimum limits on 
participating farmers’ idled percentage of acreage base (Kennedy and Viser, 1990). In 
addition, payments-in-kind (PIK) certificates were another important aspect of the 
legislation. With the introduction of PIK certificates the USDA effectively obtained the 
right to issue currency (Thompson 1990, 87). Thompson (1990, 87) states that PIK 
certificates are “dollar denominated, payable to bearer, fully negotiable, and—better than 
cash in your pocket—backed by real goods.” In addition to the fact that PIKs typically 
traded well above par, farmers certainly appreciated their introduction during the crisis. 
Direct evidence that African American farmers benefited from PIKs is unsubstantiated, 
however, due to planting reductions induced by PIKs (Browne, 1988, 227) it is plausible 
to surmise that black and small-scale farmers did not benefit from PIK provisions. 
 
Agricultural policy, 1985-1996: Discrimination vs. Hope For Black Farmers 
 
The passage of the Food Security Act of 1985 also brought forth a special program for 




percent of all farm ownership and farm operating loans were targeted by the Farmers 
Home Administration (FmHA) as limited resource loans to be provided to low income 
farmers under special terms and at reduced interest rates” (Grim 1996, 328).  Even 
though such loans were intended to address the needs of small farmers, a report from the 
Civil Rights Commission suggested that African American farmers did not significantly 
benefit from the LRL program during the 1980s, due to patterns of discrimination (U.S. 
Commission on Civil Rights, 1982). Notably, discrimination was rampant in local FmHA 
offices in the South because loan decisions were granted by county committees 
comprised primarily of local white farmers (Gilbert and Eli 2000, 135). To complicate 
matters, President Ronald Reagan cut the USDA budget in 1982 by eliminating its civil 
rights complaint division (Mittal and Powell 2000, 5).12 Grim (1996) suggests that the 
economic gap during this time widened between black farmers and their white 
counterparts, due largely to the discrimination they faced trying to obtain assistance and 
credit from agricultural agencies. Moreover, Grim (2002) suggests that black farmers 
experienced problems receiving disaster relief and capital due to government farm 
programs and policies being implemented in a discriminating fashion. Similar to the 
Agriculture and Food Act of 1981, the Food Security Act of 1985 also failed to solve the 
problem of overproduction and low prices.  
Two years later in 1987, with the passage of the Agricultural Credit Act, 
additional attempts were made to address the needs of small American farmers. The Act 
was particularly beneficial to such farmers because it made additional FmHA (now the 
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Farm Service Administration—FSA) loan funds available to small-scale farmers.  This 
was pivotal because it provided small-scale farmers the opportunity to develop a plan to 
save their farms and operate profitably.  Unfortunately, many African American farmers 
struggled to take advantage of this opportunity because as indicated, it was alleged the 
Farm Service Agency discriminated against black farmers by choosing not to process 
their loan applications.  
Three years later in 1990, the passage of the Food, Agriculture, and Conservation 
and Trade Act (FACT), explicitly brought forth assistance to black farmers. Through the 
“Outreach and Assistance Program for Socially Disadvantage Farmers and Ranchers” 
under Title XXV of the Act, efforts were made to curtail the demise of black farmers by 
providing technical and educational assistance (Brown and Christy 1994, 56). A shift 
towards assisting black farmers occurred due to the success of minority policy 
entrepreneurs defining agricultural policy in the context of civil rights.13 Furthermore, the 
program also allowed land-grant colleges to establish training programs to assist small 
family farmers with financial matters such as simple accounting strategies and effective 
bookkeeping.  
 The Farmers Home Administration’s Social Disadvantaged Program (SDA) was 
established in 1990 to provide funds for minority farmers to purchase farmland, so as to 
“increase the number of socially disadvantaged applicants (Blacks, American Indian, 
Hispanics, and Asia or Pacific Islanders) acquiring FmHA’s farm ownership loans and 
purchasing inventory farmland” (Brown and Christy 1994, 56). Both programs of the Act 
were initiated by the collaborative efforts of various farm groups such as The Federation 
                                                 




of Southern Cooperatives, The Land Loss Prevention Project, and The Farmer’s Legal 
Action Group as well as legislative entrepreneurs Congressmen Mike Espy (D-MI) and 
Senator Wyche Fowler (D-GA). However, McGraw and Taylor (1991) suggest that 
neither program has achieved the desired results due to poor implementation strategies 
and limited funding. Particularly, the FACT Act included an authorization of $10 million 
for outreach and technical assistance, but unfortunately for the first three years after its 
passage, Congress failed to appropriate any money. Since this time, only one to three 
million dollars has been appropriated in most years (Sherrod, 2004).  
1996 brought fundamental changes to agriculture with the Federal Agricultural 
Improvement and Reform Act (FAIR) and The Freedom to Farm Act. Under the FAIR 
Act the link between income support payments and farm prices were removed.  In 
addition, this legislation authorized seven-year production flexibility contract payments 
that provided producers with fixed government payments independent of current farm 
prices and production (Gardner, 2002). This piece of legislation also softened the affect 
of the global market on support payments. In addition, The Freedom to Farm Act also 
made sweeping changes to federal farm programs.  Under the Act traditional subsidy 
payments to farmers were replaced with a fixed but declining level of transition 
payments—36 billion over seven years (du Pont, 1996). In addition, the Act also 
terminated federal authority to hold farmland out of production. Allowing for greater 
planting flexibility, farmers could plant a mix of crops, excluding fruits and vegetables 
and still qualify for subsidy payments. However, at the end of seven years, unless 
Congress recommits to the Act, the old farm policies of land set-asides automatically 




Many critics contend Freedom to Farm primarily accommodates large, corporate 
farms and agribusiness partnerships as opposed to small family farms because it does not 
explicitly provide provisions guaranteeing subsidy payments or a safety net to small 
production farmers (Lilliston and Richie, 2000). Notably, in the first three years of the 
Freedom Farm program, wealthy agribusiness partnerships and large farm corporations in 
Iowa reaped over half of the 2 billion in federal farm subsidies; while the other half of the 
funds were distributed out in smaller payments of typically less than $6,000 to small 
family farmers (Ingersoll, 2000). Ralph Paige, Executive Director of the Federation of 
Southern Cooperatives, which represents the interests of black farmers, was asked in an 
interview about the impact of the Republican sponsored “Freedom to Farm Act.” Paige 
responded by saying: 
The Freedom to Farm Act is I think devastating. It is nothing more than a welfare 
program that would pay large corporate farmers to grow fence-row to fence-row. 
It does not have a safety-net in this bill that would protect family farmers for the 
long-run. It has decreasing payments that will fade out in seven years. The small 
farmers who have small acreage and small allotments will be the ones who are 
hurt most because their payments will be very small and would fade out quickly. 
For instance the Peanut Program should not be tampered with because it does 
keep farmers on the land and many poor people in rural communities especially in 
Georgia, Alabama, and South Carolina derive a living from the Peanut Program  
N. Paget-Clarke (personal communication, February, 1996). 
 
Clearly the Freedom to Farm Act poses many problems for small farmers, both black and 
white. To recapture aspects of the aforementioned discussion, table 2.1 summarizes the 







Table 2.1: Summary of Relevant Agricultural Acts 
Act Provisions Benefits Explanations 
Agriculture 
Adjustment Act  
of 1933 (AAA) 
Awarded productions allotment; 




Farm Bureau lobby 
successfully 
AAA 1938 Restricted production of crops; 




Farm Bureau lobby 
successfully 
AAA 1949 Established mandatory 




Farm Bureau dominates 
access to House 
Agriculture Committee 
AAA 1954 Maintained mandatory commodity 
support; and farm income support 
Largest 
landowners 
Farm Bureau lobby 
successfully 
AAA 1956 Maintained mandatory commodity 
support: and farm income support 
Largest 
landowners 
Farm Bureau lobby 
successfully 
Food and 
Agriculture Act of 
1965 (FAA) 
Permitted voluntary acreage 
control; provided economic 
development program to fight 
rural poverty 
Family farmers 
of feed grain, 
wheat, and cotton 
Commodity organizations 






Protection Act of 
1973 (ACPA) 
Farm income supplemented only 
when commodity prices fell below 
legislated “target prices;” food 
stamp program extended 
Consumer 
advocates 
Farm state Republican 
(ND) Milton Young spurs 
action of Senate 
Agriculture Committee 
Agriculture and 
Food Act of 1981 
(AFA) 
Reduced agricultural spending 
and limited payments to $50,000 
per year to farmers who 
participated in agricultural 
programs; expanded commodity 
donations abroad 
Farm Bureau Commodity experts lobby 
successfully; President 
Reagan and John Block 
influence Congress to 
decrease price-support 
payments 
Food Security Act 
of 1985 (FSA) 
Sought to maintain farm income 
while reducing costs; provided for 
acreage reduction if agricultural 
supplies became excessive 
Commodity 
groups 
Commodity experts lobby 
successfully 
Agricultural Credit 
Act of 1987 (ACA) 
Introduced new provisions of 
FCA Act of 1971; established new 
borrower rights and procedures 
for restructuring of loans 
Family farmers Small interested farming 
groups lobby successfully 
Food, Agriculture, 
Conservation, and 
Trade Act of 1990 
(FACT) 
Continued to provide loan rates 
linked to market prices; 
authorized price supports based on 
target prices; increased 
environmental regulations; 







Minority farm groups, 
policy entrepreneurs and 





Reform Act of 
1996 (FAIR) 
Removed link between income 
support payments and farm prices; 
authorized 7-year production 




Commodity experts lobby 
successfully 
Freedom to Farm 
Act of 1996 
Provided greater planting 











Aside from loan and educational/technical assistance programs, the major component of 
post New-Deal agricultural policy has been a mix of price support and income policies 
executed through commodity programs.  The majority of these programs have included 
supply control through acreage restrictions, long-term land retirement, price supports for 
direct purchases of commodities and the use of non-recourse price loans along with PIK 
certificates (Gardner 2002). While large-scale farmers were adjusting and benefiting from 
such policies and programs, black farmers were gradually disappearing while battling the 
pernicious effects of discrimination.  
Furthermore, black farmers have consistently been on the outside looking in when 
seeking to influence the agenda of agricultural policy. Browne (1988) suggests that 
agriculture as a policy arena is so large and diversely structured that it inherently affects a 
multitude of interests. Thus, some interests exercise disproportionate influence, thereby 
limiting the opportunity for others to exert any pressure at all (Brown 1998, 5). With this 
in mind—the influences and structure of post-New Deal agricultural policy have 
precluded African American farmers from acquiring the income, credit and relief needed 
to not only prosper as independent farmers, but to maintain their subsistence. Before 
mapping the agricultural agenda and documenting the displaced interests of black 
farmers, the next chapter provides the groundwork for the remaining analysis by 






Agenda Setting and Issue Definition:  
Disrupting Policy Equilibria 
 
 
  “The key is to understand why certain issues receive 
 governmental attention and others seemingly of equal  
 merit are ignored or bypassed by the decisions-makers at  
 all levels of government.” 




Theories of Agenda Setting and Government Policy 
 
The multiple relationships that emerge during agenda setting explain how an issue is 
defined and why a particular issue may not achieve agenda status.  In order for a problem 
to be given institutional priority, it must first be transformed into an issue that Congress 
has agreed to address. Scholars of public policy understand the importance of such a 
distinction because problems placed on the systemic agenda do not carry the same level 
of prominence as those placed on the institutional agenda. This is because most problems 
on the systemic agenda have yet to gain the active attention of policymakers.   
 Cobb and Elder (1983, 83) state the systemic agenda “consists of all issues that 
are commonly perceived by members of the political community as meriting public 
attention and as involving matters within the legitimate jurisdiction of existing 
governmental authority.”  In part, the systemic agenda is a discussion agenda in which 
most items on it will be general and abstract rather than specific and comprehensive 
(Anderson 1997, 99).  In comparison, the institutional agenda is much more substantial.  
The institutional agenda is essentially an action agenda in which discussion items are 
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more concrete and specified.  Specifically, those items placed on this agenda have in 
essence gained enough support to be converted from a problem into an issue.   
Eyestone (1978) describes a problem as some state of affairs that injures or unfairly 
affects a particular sector of society. He contends that issues are the fuel of politics 
because they provide the energy for the day-to-day business of government (Eyestone 
1978, 1).  Thus, Cobb and Elder (1983, 32) argue that an issue is a “conflict between two 
or more identifiable groups over procedural or substantive matters relating to the 
distribution of positions or resources.”  
Ripley (1985, 106-107) highlights a continuum of options that government 
officials can take in placing an individual item on the governmental agenda.  Each of 
these particular options are important because they illustrate how institutional actors can 
either take a passive or an active role in defining a particular agenda item. In addition, 
highlighting these options reveal how certain values and ideologies are bolstered while 
others are ignored.  Eyestone (1978, 5) asserts that if one group builds a range of contacts 
within government, and another group is unable to do so, the lesser group will have a 
more difficult time achieving its policy pursuits. 
The first option coined “Let it happen,” describes how government takes a passive 
role in agenda setting. In essence, government maintains points of access and 
communication so that groups can place pressure on relevant institutional leaders.   
Under this option interest groups seek to heighten public awareness and lobby 
government officials to get their concerns placed on the institutional agenda.  This was 
illustrated during the 1960s when various grassroots organizations attracted considerable 
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attention to a number of environmental problems in the United States (Adolino and Blake 
2001, 12).  
The option of “Encourage it to happen,” illustrates how government aids groups 
in defining, prioritizing, and articulating their problems.  Specifically, this particular 
option seeks to equip individuals to participate in the definition of problems.  
The primary purpose is not to explicitly identify and define problems for those involved, 
rather it is to equalize the resources so that the process does not overtly favor the haves 
over the have nots. Eyestone (1978) suggests such resources are beneficial because  
organized interests (particularly those with minimal resources) are in turn able to 
establish their “professional” group activities, and thus further group endeavors.   
The third option, “Make it happen,” emphasizes those instances in which 
government actors play an “active” role in setting goals and defining problems.  As 
Randall Ripley states, “policy makers do not wait for the system to work; they direct its 
operations by establishing problem-defining and priority-setting mechanisms within 
government” (107). For example, the Clinton administration’s failed attempt for 
sweeping health policy reform in the early 1990s is an illustration of such action (Adolino 
and Blake 2001, 13). 
  “Don’t let it happen,” involves those instances in which government actors 
choose to restrict and close channels of access and communication.  From this 
perspective, institutions function along side groups and participants who are seeking to 
limit or impede particular problems from gaining institutional attention. Anderson (1997, 
106) notes this was apparent during the 1950s in the South when white activists 
succeeded in stifling minority demands for equal rights. In sum, each of the 
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aforementioned options offers a different explanation of the role of government in agenda 
setting. Thus, agenda setting is the study of social stability and social change as it relates 
to groups and or governmental institutions (Dearing and Rogers 1996, 2). The following 
section seeks to elucidate this process by first examining the bottom-up approach to the 
study of agenda setting.   
 
A Bottom-Up Perspective 
Most studies that focus on the dynamics of agenda setting tend to take either a “bottom-
up” or a “top-down” approach.  Many scholars (Hasan and Simmons, 1989; Hofrenning, 
1989; Eyestone, 1978; Cobb and Elder, 1972; Down, 1972) regard a bottom-up approach 
as pluralist; therefore emphasis is placed on the role of the public and interest groups in 
developing the political agenda (Studlar 1990, 274). A bottom-up approach to agenda 
setting centers on the process by which issues begin in the public realm and rise onto the 
governmental agenda through circumstances of public opinion, social 
movements/influences, and or interest group activity.  For example, Stimson (1999) 
suggests that the electorate responds to excesses on a left-right continuum and as a result, 
drives change at the elite level.  As such, policy mood or the public’s underlying 
sentiment towards a particular issue drives policy.  
Additional studies (Grossback, 2000; Stimson, Makuen & Erikson, 1995) 
highlight the influence of public opinion, however they place greater emphasis on the 
existence of representation—representation in the form of politicos representing his or 
her constituents. Through the use of survey opinion polls such studies contend that when 
policy drifts away from the public’s demands, elections can serve as a control mechanism 
33  
 
to ensure the public’s policy preferences are represented. These particular studies are 
important because they illustrate how and why public sentiment may or may not be 
consistent with the decisions made by policymakers. Furthermore, these studies also 
reinforce the observations by Baumgartner and Jones (1993) who express how popular 
enthusiasm surrounding a given issue provides policymakers the conditions to create new 
institutions to support or even oppose particular policy programs.  
Equally important, studies that point to social movements and social influences 
are also beneficial in understanding agenda setting.  Chong, (1991) illustrates that large-
scale political activism or “public spirited collective action,” such as that on the 
environment or civil rights have such a strong ideological element that it can push a 
problem from the grounds of the public to the government’s door.  As Chong describes 
through his supply-and-demand model, successful forms of collective action must include 
(1) steadfast leadership (2) political institutions (such as Congress) that are or have 
become willing to institute change and reform and (3) activists who have joined the 
movement must exceed the strength of opposing forces (164).  Chong states that in order 
for proponents of change to achieve their goal, they must develop and maintain a 
movement that embodies a combination of disruption, pressure, and moral persuasion, 
which seeks to force local authorities and the federal government to adhere to its 
demands (142). Thus as Chong (1991) suggests, interest group activity is consequential 
because it has the ability to impel government to pay attention to issues that otherwise 
would have been displaced. 
Interest groups and the relationship they establish with government institutions 
also contribute to influencing the agenda (Milakovich and Gordon, 2001; Anderson, 
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1997; Kingdon, 1995).  Baumgartner and Jones, (1993) and Worsham (1998) recognize 
how the monopolistic goals of interest group politics influence issue definition and the 
institutional agenda. Their research helps to highlight how the scope of conflict, change 
in issue image, and the movement of an issue from one venue to another can disrupt 
policy equilibria. In addition, the institutional arrangement of policy images and policy 
venues are equally important in relation to interest groups and their affect on the agenda 
because they illustrate the dynamics and conflict associated with various policies and 
why they may not gain agenda status (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993).  This contention 
confirms the argument by Dearing and Rogers (1996, 2) who assert that agenda setting 
offers an explanation for why certain issues are addressed through policy actions while 
other issues are ignored.   
 Equally important, the bottom-up or pluralist approach to agenda setting not only 
involves public discourse, social movements/influences, and interest group politics, but it 
also involves the media.  Scholars emphasize this point by highlighting the influence that 
the media has on framing the public’s policy preferences and political participation 
(Kellstedt, 2000; Kernell 1993; Traugott, 1992).  Iyengar and Kinder (1987) assert that 
the media powerfully influences which problems citizens regard as the nation’s most 
serious, arguing that issues such as unemployment, energy shortages, and overall 
economic instability become high priority for public policy only if such issues become a 
primary news item for the networks.  However, news coverage does not have to first filter 
through the public; rather it can directly influence policy elites.  Cook et al (1983) take up 
this endeavor by examining the impact of the media on the general public, policy makers, 
interest group leaders, and public policy. Using an experimental design constructed 
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around a single media event, the authors conclude that the media influenced views about 
issue importance among the general public and government policy makers.  The authors 
suggest subsequent policy changes did not result from a change in public opinion, but 
rather from collaboration between journalists and government staff members (32).   
Overall, research that has focused on the media has been relatively valuable to the 
pluralistic approach to agenda setting, illustrating how the media can serve as a catalyst 
and a tool to shape the systemic and governmental agenda. Now that I have provided a 
basic understanding of the bottom-up approach of agenda setting, and I will now explore 
the dynamics inherent from the top-down perspective. 
 
A Top-Down Perspective 
Agenda setting from a top-down approach view the major initiatives deriving from 
government officials and policy communities (Kingdon, 1995; Studlar, 1990; Durant and 
Diehl, 1989; Nelson, 1984; Walker, 1977).  This approach emphasizes how government 
actors and structures generate and or influence items on the institutional agenda without 
the issue moving from the public, onto the formal agenda.  For example, the broad power 
of Congress to revise a current statute and fund or cut appropriations is quite influential 
on the agenda setting process (Anderson, 1997).  The internal structure and jurisdictional 
struggles within Congress illustrates its direct influence on defining and bolstering 
particular issues.  Jurisdictional battles within Congress are influential to the 
governmental agenda because such battles serve as a precursor to the success or failure of 
a particular policy issue (Lees 1967, 6).  Baumgartner and Jones (1993) buttress this point 
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by suggesting that the effect of different committees and subcommittees claiming 
jurisdiction over a particular issue lead to significant policy changes.   
For example, Gandy (1982) describes how in the House during January of 1970, 
responsibility for education was divided among three subcommittees, and their chairs 
frequently struggled over control of how best to improve educational learning. 
Committee chair John Brademas (D-IN) sought to improve education through the 
utilization of instructional technology, while Edith Green (R-OR) felt states should have 
the discretion to decide the appropriate method. The jurisdictional battle came to a close 
when Green’s subcommittee effectively investigated the shortcomings of the Office of 
Education, and as a result states were granted control of Title III education programs. The 
competition between Brademas and Green is pertinent to agenda setting because it 
illustrates the institutional struggle involved in defining and addressing a particular issue, 
and how doing so can beseech various interests at different levels of government. 
 In addition, King (1997, 16) argues that a “turf war” decided who sat at the table 
crafting the landmark Civil Rights Act of 1964. King contends that if the bill was not 
strategically written to award jurisdiction in the Senate to the Commerce Committee and 
the Judiciary Committee in the House, the Civil Rights Act would have died in the hands 
of Southerners on hostile committees.  Thus, as Baumgartner and Jones (1993) argue, 
having a supportive committee in Congress is beneficial as long as the committee does 
not lose its jurisdiction.  However, the broad powers and effects of Congress may not 
always constitute a top-down occurrence of agenda setting. Browne (1988) and Mayhew 
(1974) emphasize that congressional action is not solely the result of policy 
entrepreneuralism; but a desire to secure and adhere to constituents for reelection. From 
37  
 
this perspective congressional activity may indicate a bottom-up approach to agenda 
setting as well.   
Baumgartner and Jones (1993) assert that hearings are important to committees 
and subcommittees because not only do they signal the importance of an issue, but they 
can serve as a fact finding exercise beneficial in controlling the agenda and claiming new 
ground. For instance, Gandy (1982) indicates that the Joint Economic Committee 
organized hearings in 1966 merely in hopes of collecting information about the status of 
the education market.  Furthermore, Talbert, Jones, and Baumgartner (1995) explore the 
importance of congressional hearings by focusing on four issue areas: pesticides, 
smoking, drug abuse, and civilian nuclear power. Through the utilization of 3,000 
congressional hearings and witnesses who appeared at the hearings, the authors conclude 
that both legislative and nonlegislative hearings are subject to jurisdictional change over 
time.  More importantly, nonlegislative hearings are found to be an integral part of the 
process “through which issues are raised, redefined, and put on the table for serious 
consideration” (400).  In sum, the ability of Congress to set the agenda is not only 
conditioned by its broad statutory powers but also by its pervasive jurisdictional 
struggles. 
Not only is Congress important to agenda setting, but the institutional actions of 
the president are also influential (Kernell, 1993; Neustadt, 1990). Baumgartner and Jones 
(1993) state “no other single actor can focus attention as clearly, or change the 
motivations of such a great number of other actors, as the president” (241).  Specifically, 
the authors illustrate in the case of drug policy and urban affairs, how the president 
pushed these particular issues high onto the agenda. As Bosso (1987, 261) states, the 
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president has the ability to serve as the political system’s thermostat, capable of heating 
up or cooling down the politics of any single issue. Paul Light (1999) suggests that a 
president with strong external resources such as party support in Congress, public 
approval, a sizeable electoral margin, and patronage has the ability to influence the 
agenda setting process. Thus, the institutional relationship between the administration and 
Congress is pivotal in the president affecting the agenda setting process (Light 1999, 46). 
Hence, once the president gains congressional support the ability to affect the agenda is 
greatly strengthened. For instance, President Lyndon Johnson’s declaration of a War on 
Poverty did a great deal to influence congressional attitudes toward antipoverty programs 
(Eyestone 1978, 91). 
In addition to the institutional actions of the president, scholars argue that the 
Court is not only an institution that adjudicates cases but it is also an institution that 
makes political decisions, which in turn can bring attention to a particular policy issue or 
redefine an issue currently on the congressional agenda (Flemming et al 1997; McGuire 
and Palmer, 1996; Perry, 1991). Take for example, the issue of abortion. When the 
Supreme Court ruled on Roe V. Wade in January 1973 that states could not interfere with 
the decisions made by a woman and her doctor to have an abortion in the first trimester of 
pregnancy, Congress introduced several bills to amend the Constitution to extend 
constitutional rights to unborn children (Eyestone 1978, 112). Such an occurrence 
confirms Baumgartner and Jones’ (1993) contention that decisions by the Court should be 
considered when understanding how policy issues emerge and change over time. In part, 
decisions rendered by the Court—particularly the Supreme Court can cause a shift in the 
system-wide attention and image to underlying policy issues (Flemming et al, 1997).  In 
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particular, Baumgartner and Jones (1993) and Flemming, et al (1997) argue that the 
Court’s actions can direct attention to particular policies and or problems. As a result, 
certain cases heard by the Court can spur interest group activity to oppose or favor the 
issue it is deciding on, and in turn can lead the Court to act accordingly.  
To illustrate this point, Calderia and Wright (1998, 1111, 1123) argue the 
presence of amici curiae during case selection communicates to the Supreme Court 
information about the constellation of forces at play in the litigation, who is at risk, and 
the number and variety of interests regarding the litigation as important. The authors 
conclude that one or more amicus curiae briefs advocating or opposing certiorari 
increases the likelihood of the Court to grant certiorari (1122). Thus, the authors’ 
research is valuable to our understanding of agenda setting because it illustrates how 
organized interests can effectively influence which cases are placed on the Court’s 
agenda, and how the Court may ultimately decide those cases.  From this perspective the 
Court is a representative institution whose political decisions are not formed in a vacuum 
(Calderia and Wright, 1998). Therefore as Perry (1991, 6) argues, these are the political 
decisions that can influence and set the agenda for other political institutions for years to 
come. To further understand the dynamics involved in agenda setting, the following 
section describes the importance and influences involved in how an issue is defined on 
the agenda.  
 
Agenda Status and Issue Definition 
 
As Kelly Tzoumis (2001, 5) asserts, a policy often reaches Congressional attention 
because it has been framed or defined in a fashion that warrants governmental action. 
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Baumgartner and Jones (1993) indicate how a policy is framed is important because it 
determines the players and interests that will be involved in the issue.  Schattschneider 
(1960) argues that policy losers strive to broaden the scope of the conflict in hopes of 
persuading nonparticipants into understanding the issue from their perspective. Thus, 
expanding the scope is significant because it is instrumental in determining how the issue 
is defined, and consequently which policy is implemented. Tzoumis (2001, 5) asserts that 
if an issue is defined in a manner in which government is willing to address, then it will 
have a greater propensity of capturing congressional attention.  
According to Eyestone (1978, 175), agenda status is primarily achieved only with 
regard to endemic issues—“public problems that extend over a period of years and 
generate incremental solutions.” Eyestone (1978) suggests that Congress is consequential 
to the status of an issue because it is this institution that groups seek to access in order to 
have their problem addressed by policymakers. Kingdon (1995, 199) indicates groups 
who are able to gain access are far more likely to bolster their issues on the agenda and 
block consideration of proposals they do not prefer. Furthermore, such groups are more 
likely to define the image of the issue according to their interests (Baumgartner and Jones 
1993). Take for example the issue of biotechnology.  Christopher Plein (1991) points out 
that the biotechnology industry was able to dispel fears concerning techniques to modify 
life forms for research and commercial uses by consistently portraying biotechnology in a 
positive image beneficial to society.  This was partly accomplished by the industry’s 
ability to line up supporters and casting aspersions on opponents.  
Considering the notion of policy images, Baumgartner and Jones (1993, 25) argue 
that how a policy issue is discussed or defined has the propensity to attract interests that 
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were previously uninvolved in the issue. For instance, Derthick (1979) describes how 
policymaking for Social Security was relatively consensual and stable until the 1970s 
when it faced financial problems. Derthick points out that once Social Security was 
discussed as a financial burden detrimental to the economy, participants from both 
private and public sectors were galvanized. For example, the Treasury Department, which 
had not been involved in social security policymaking for nearly thirty years, suddenly 
became interested and commissioned an independent actuarial audit to evaluate the 
overall cost of the system and its financial condition (1979, 388). Likewise, Congress 
also expressed concerned with the financial status of Social Security when the Finance 
Committee conducted an independent analysis, which concluded that the financial 
condition of the system was in disarray, and that major steps were needed to restore the 
financial health of the Old Age Survivors Disability Insurance Program (OASDIP). As 
Derthick (1979) illustrates, the negative financial image of Social Security that emerged 
during the 1970s not only shaped the discussions about the system, but was also the 
impetus for the emergence of additional interests.  
In many instances once an issue is transformed or becomes galvanized and the 
number of participants increases, a shift in venue is more likely to occur as well 
(Baumgartner and Jones 1991, 1047). Baumgartner and Jones (1993, 31) state that 
“policy venues can be monopolistic or shared, that is, a single issue may simultaneously 
be subject to the jurisdiction of several institutions, or may be within the domain only of 
one set of institutions.” In many instances when the venue of a policy changes, those 
participants who previously had minimal influence may find themselves with greater 
power.    
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As a brief illustration of how a change in issue definition and policy venue 
reinforce themselves, and how the minority can become the majority, Baumgartner and 
Jones (1991, 1048) provided an interesting example of an environmental group, which is 
consistently on the losing end of regulatory decisions made in the executive branch of the 
federal government. The authors postulate that if this displaced environmental group 
carries their issue to an uninvolved group in Congress, there is the possibility that a more 
favorable hearing in this particular jurisdiction will be afforded to them. Assuming this is 
the case, Congress may in turn pass legislation—allowing supporters access to the courts 
or in the regulatory process. As a result, environmentalists are also provided with 
additional influence in venues that had previously been inaccessible. Furthermore, the 
laws passed by Congress may change or redevelop the image of the issue, which can 
make for shared policy jurisdiction as well as expand the scope of conflict.   
Oftentimes, participants who wage a subsystem can mold or define an issue in a 
manner consistent with its interests. Milakovich and Gordon (2001, 89) simplistically 
define a subsystem as “a political alliance uniting members of an administrative agency, a 
congressional committee or subcommittee, and an interest group with shared values and 
preferences in the same substantive area of policy making.” Such an institutional 
arrangement can prohibit an array of interests from becoming involved in the policy 
making process, thus allowing the subsystem to define the issue accordingly, and in most 
cases at the expense of those formerly excluded. “Subsystems then, are, a means of 
getting around the seeming inability of groups to effect closure on decisions that affect 
large numbers of interests” (Worsham 2004, 4).  Worsham (1998, 486) argues that a 
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“subsystem’s ability to maintain policy making autonomy is not absolute; but rather it 
varies across time and policy area.”   
Worsham (1998) illustrates that subsystem politics may assume any of three 
forms---dominate, transitory, or competing coalitions. Dominate coalitions benefit select 
interests as opposed to the public interest. Under such an arrangement, a particular 
committee or subcommittee is able to establish and control formidable jurisdiction in a 
particular policy area. Transitory coalitions emerge when “latent interests of some 
members of a dominant coalition supersede the interests they share in common with other 
members of the dominant coalition” (Worsham1998, 488). In essence, transitory 
coalitions bargain and compromise over the distribution of benefits and costs linked with 
a particular policy.  
Competitive coalitions surface when a dominant coalition is openly challenged by 
a new coalition. In some instances this may occur when transitory coalitions engage in 
prolonged conflict, in which formerly excluded minority interests are able to effectively 
compete over the benefits of a particular policy. Likewise, the development of 
competitive coalitions can lead to a change in the image of an issue, which may cause a 
traditionally dominant coalition to collapse. For example, Baumgartner and Jones (1993) 
describe how nuclear power during the 1940s and 1950s was controlled by a powerful 
monopoly or a dominant coalition. However, in the 1960s and 1970s, the image of 
nuclear power changed from being uncontroversial and enthusiastic to that of perceived 
risk and danger. Once the image of the issue changed, a shift in venue followed, and as a 
result the strong monopoly in Congress and industry were consequently destroyed. Such 
an illustration indicates that subsystem autonomy is never permanent through time, but 
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rather, autonomy is contingent upon the variant of subsystem politics at play (Worsham, 
1998). To illustrate how the aforementioned perspectives and insights to agenda setting 
are conceptualized throughout the remainder of this research, the following section 




The theoretical aim of this study seeks to examine the institutional actions of Congress 
from a systems perspective as characterized by subsystem politics (i.e. meso-level 
analysis) and punctuating events. The system perspective defines politics and 
government as a conceptualized system of “inputs, throughputs and outputs functioning 
in an environment that provided the energy required by the system” (Peters 1998, 112). 
Peters (1998, 112) indicates that the “energy” required by the system includes factors 
such as the demands and supports from interest groups and individuals, and the 
changes/events that occur within and or outside the institutional workings of the system. 
The outputs of the system are policies, with a feedback loop reflecting responses to those 
policies.   
Considering punctuating events can bring forth institutional change (see 
Baumgartner and Jones, 1993) meso-level analysis becomes all the more relevant, 
because attention is then placed on the functioning of specific institutions and interests, 
and the processes of constructing public policy.  In this case, the primary institution of 
concern is Congress—specifically congressional committees. Baumgartner and Jones 
(1993) suggest if the activity by congressional committees consistently fails to represent a 
particular group of interests, the assumption holds that certain policy problems in relation 
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to that group may be displaced or defined in an antagonistic fashion.  Thus, the study 
assumes that although congressional Agricultural Committees may have direct influence 
over the agricultural agenda, events and inputs from the environment can influence their 
agenda setting pursuits and activity. Hence, the stimuli of punctuating events and the 
actions of other institutional actors and or groups can reinforce or counterbalance the 
political underpinnings involved in the agenda setting process.  
In general, the theory postulates Agricultural Committees may serve as the 
institutional anchor for subsystem arrangement and policy monopoly, but punctuating 
events can and do alter the equilibria established by such an arrangement. Moreover, not 
only can subsystem equilibria be disrupted, but punctuating events can and do alter policy 
outputs as well. Thus, I expect to find evidence that shocks to the system and or the 
actions of policy entrepreneurs will influence the agenda setting of agricultural support 
policy. On this note, Baumgartner and Jones (2002, 11) contend that most system models 
of congressional behavior generally illustrate occurrences of negative feedback. With this 
in mind, the next two chapters seek to illustrate whether this analysis is characteristic of 

















Tracking Agenda Status 
 
 
   “Bill introduction and committee referral are important aspects of 
agenda setting that no subsystem can ignore if it is to maintain a 
  policy monopoly.” 
- Jeff Worsham (1998, 494) 
 
 
In the preceding chapters I discussed the troubled journey of African American farmers, 
and how the evolution of pertinent agricultural legislation failed to address and in effect 
exacerbated many of the problems/struggles black farmers faced. Due to the norms, 
culture, and political relationships formed, black farmers struggled to find a seat at the 
table of agenda setting. When the Farm Security Administration (FSA) was meeting their 
needs, the dominant subsystem arrangement between southern congressional members of 
the Agriculture Committees, the USDA and the interests of large—white landowners (i.e. 
AFBF) put an end to such accommodation.   
 This chapter seeks to understand this struggle by focusing on bill introductions as 
the first of two ways in which I explore how Congress governs the agenda of agricultural 
support policy over the post-war era. As Dearing and Rogers (1996, 1) argue, agenda 
setting is an ongoing competition among issue proponents to gain the attention of policy 
elites. Thus, bill introductions are useful in understanding this process because they serve 
as an important indicator of congressional interest in a particular policy area (Worsham, 
2004; Wilkerson, Feeley, Schiereck and Sue, 1999). Moreover, not only do introductions 
indicate that an issue has made it onto the formal agenda, but its referral illustrates 
committee jurisdiction, underlying competition, and possible attempts of policy coupling.  
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Particularly, the purpose of this chapter is three-fold. First, I seek to explore the 
formal agenda by examining the ebb and flow of bill introductions in both chambers over 
the post-war period in the policy areas of civil rights and agriculture. This cross 
comparison is not intended to illustrate a systematic relationship, but rather a snapshot of 
the overall level of activity and the instances where introductions (i.e. activity) increase 
in both policy areas.  Second, I examine the issue composition of the introductions. In 
doing so, I am able to decipher the topics that receive the most attention in both policy 
areas—thus serving as a conduit to potential policy coupling. Third, I examine the 
referral of bill introductions—paying special attention to those that exhibit policy 
coupling. The analysis of bill referrals is important because Baumgartner and Jones 
(1993) argue they highlight the dynamics of policy jurisdiction. Furthermore, examining 
referrals seeks to illustrate not only committee competition and policy monopoly, but also 
whether the introduction of policy coupling escapes referral to a particular committee due 





As with most agenda studies, the postwar period is commonly used as the starting point 
for initiating data trends. The dynamics of federal agricultural policy after the 1940s, and 
the effects of pertinent focusing events, qualifies the postwar period as the ideal time 
frame for analysis. The time span of analysis for this study begins in 1940 and ends in 
1998, providing over fifty years of examination concerning the agenda of agricultural 
support policy. The index volumes of the Congressional Record were utilized to assess 
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bill introduction activity in both chambers from 1940-1998 in each policy area—civil 
rights and agriculture.  
The Congressional Record identifies the sponsors of the legislation, along with 
the committees, where the bills are referred, the topic of legislation, whether it is reported 
from committee, subject to amendment, passed in the chamber of origin, and its lifespan 
in the other chamber. The search items used to track civil rights include: civil rights, 
African-Americans, black Americans, colored people, negro/negroes, race relations, 
racial discrimination, racial segregation, and any other “see also” indicated by the index. 
The search terms used for agriculture focus on topics of concern to African-American 
farmers which included: crop diversification, cotton, farm loans, price supports, soil 
conservation, tenant farmers, sharecroppers, relief programs, and any references to the 
USDA handling of any of the previous terms, as well as legislation dealing with the 
composition of county agricultural committees and or agents.14 
 The utilization of bill titles was employed to discern the topics under each policy 
arena. This method was a straightforward approach in the sense that anytime a bill title 
highlighted a particular topic it was then coded accordingly. For example, under the 
policy area of civil rights I would code a title “to prohibit discrimination within 
employment” as an employment topic, while under the policy area of agriculture I would 
code a bill title “to extend price support programs” as a price support topic, and so forth. 
The notion of policy coupling occurs when either policy area intersects with the other. 
                                                 
14 Several sources were consulted to compose the list of search items, including two studies conducted by 
the US Commission on Civil Rights that detailed the plight of African American farmers. U.S. Commission 
on Civil Rights. (1965). Equal Opportunity in Farm Programs: An Appraisal of Services Rendered by 
Agencies of the United States Department of Agriculture. Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO. U.S. Commission 
on Civil Rights. (1982). The Decline of Black Farming in America: A Report of the United States 





For instance, a bill title “to prohibit discrimination within farm loan programs” or “to 
provide farm credit to black farmers” would be an example of such coupling.15  
 
Mapping the Agenda of Civil Rights 
To facilitate analysis and the presentation of the findings, the following section of this 
chapter is structured according to the two following questions: “What receives 
attention?” and “Who has jurisdictional control?”  The first question is intended to assess 
the level of activity and the issues that receive attention on the civil rights agenda, while 
the second question seeks to illustrate committee competition and policy monopoly. 
While the next chapter will further elucidate this activity, this chapter begins the 
exploration with the analysis of descriptive graphs and tables. Although more technical 
methods of analysis are available, descriptive graphs are effective because Baumgartner 
and Jones (1993, 269) state graphs “speak for themselves.” 
  
 
What Receives Attention? 
After employing the aforementioned search for civil rights there were a total of 1,650 
introductions produced (Table 4.1). There were 1,321 in the House and 329 in the Senate. 
On the whole, civil rights received minimal attention in the immediate years following 
World War II. For the most part, most of the civil rights-related proposals centered 
primarily on employment issues. However this quickly changed, when attention to civil 
rights peaked in 1963-64 during the 88th Congress. Particularly, the level of activity as 
measured by bill introductions has not been as striking since the height of the civil rights 
                                                 
15 Majority of the titles were relatively distinct, making the coding of topics less ambiguous. However like 
most studies that involve content analysis, there were instances in which subjectivity was exercised. 
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movement and the subsequent landmark Civil Rights Act of 1964. Table 4.1 and Figure 
4.1 provide a broad picture of the integral level of attention toward civil rights. Aside 
from the dramatic increase and decrease in activity, what is also telling is the mix of 
issues on the agenda of the House and Senate, and how certain issues tend to receive 
more attention than others. As such, specific aspects of Figure 4.1 will be discussed in the 





















Table 4.1: Civil Rights Bill Introductions By Session 
Year Session Introductions 
1939 76 0 
1941 77 1 
1943 78 8 
1945 79 21 
1947 80 17 
1949 81 22 
1951 82 18 
1953 83 21 
1955 84 65 
1957 85 98 
1959 86 122 
1961 87 182 
1963 88 279 
1965 89 257 
1967 90 33 
1969 91 48 
1971 92 24 
1973 93 19 
1975 94 44 
1977 95 42 
1979 96 25 
1981 97 34 
1983 98 31 
1985 99 26 
1987 100 14 
1989 101 27 
1991 102 50 
1993 103 54 
1995 104 46 
1997 105 22 























































Succinctly, Figures 4.2 (House) and Figure 4.3 (Senate) explore the answer to the 
question “what receives attention”—in both chambers. From 1956-1963, advancing the 
cause of civil rights/civil rights amendments received the most attention in the House. 
Although not as acute, this issue is also on the Senate agenda along with other proposals 
that address violence, school desegregation, voting rights, and institutional housekeeping. 
Thus as illustrated in the figures, from 1957 through 1963, the House places more 
attention on one topic area, while the less active Senate introduces a mix of issues. 
Notably, in 1965 during the 89th Congress, there is a dramatic shift in attention from civil 
rights amendments/constitutional rights to the topic of voting rights. Such an illustration 
is indicative of the passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. The emergence of voting 
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After 1967 the level of attention on civil rights wanes, but the agenda in both 
chambers becomes increasingly diverse and multi-issued. In particular, from the 90th 
Congress to the end of the analysis period, civil rights policies proposed range from 
social and economic issues to overall individual and religious rights. This might be due to 
more specific entries in the Congressional Record, or it might accurately reflect the 
broader discussions of civil rights inspired by the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Klinkner and 
Smith (1999) provide some evidence for the latter, suggesting that the Act of 1964 served 
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as a precursor to the variety of civil rights issues/reforms that emerged over the next three 
decades. An interesting aspect to this point is evident in the last eight years of the 
analysis. Particularly in the Senate from 1991 through 1998, issues concerning religious 
rights appear on the agenda. Aside from receiving only scant attention, what is most 
interesting is that such issues had not been explicitly introduced on the agenda prior to 
the watershed era of the 88th Congress—thus confirming the previously stated 
observations of Klinkner and Smith (1999).  Next, to further explore the civil rights 
agenda, the examination of bill referrals will be assessed to highlight possible 
occurrences of committee competition and policy monopoly. 
 
Who has Jurisdictional Control? 
Having mapped the issues on the agenda, the next question to examine is “who has 
jurisdictional control?” Bill referrals are beneficial in answering such a question because 
as King (1997) argues, referrals enable a committee to expand its jurisdictional prowess 
in the policy making process. Figures 4.4 and 4.5 illustrate this dynamic in both the 
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A few things are apparent from Figures 4.4 and 4.5. First, over 65% of the issues 
present on the agenda in both chambers are referred to the Judiciary Committee. This is 
not surprising considering the common law jurisdiction the committee has in addressing 
issues of equality and rights. What is intriguing from these graphs is the early 1960s 
illustrate the existence of slight competition. In particular, during the era of the civil 
rights movement from 1959-1964, 25% of the introductions are referred to the Labor 
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Committee. In part, most of these proposals involve denying aid to educational 
institutions practicing discrimination. In addition, there is also a small bleep on the radar 
by the Administration Committee in the House and the Rules Committee in the Senate. 
The proposals that are referred to these committees involve voting rights issues—such as 
the elimination of the poll tax and the preservation of voting records. It is important to 
emphasize this juncture of small competition corresponds to the increase in attention to 
civil rights as noted in the previous section. As such, the apex in attention and the period 
of minor competition are both indicative of the civil rights movement and the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964.  
By 1967 during the 90th Congress, up until the early 1990s, committee 
competition diminishes along with the level of attention towards civil rights issues. 
Indeed, it appears the period of the civil rights movement and the subsequent Act of 1964 
functions as a shock to the system. To some degree, we see that the disturbance is 
characteristic of negative feedback because the initial disturbance becomes smaller as it 
works its way through time (Baumgartner and Jones1993, 6). Not until 1991 are there 
evident observations of competition during the analysis period. As indicated by Figures 
4.4 and 4.5, a marginal degree of competition is noticeable between 1991 and 1998. 
During this time span the bulk of civil rights proposals involved mainly economic and 
individual rights—issues, which were referred primarily to the Judiciary, Labor, and the 
Government Operations Committees. This minor vying between committees is reflective 
of the mix of topics that arise on the agenda in both chambers. Aside from marginal 
competition in the early 1960s and the minor degree of competition in the mid 1990s—
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particularly in the 104th Congress, the Judiciary Committee is the most dominant venue 
for referrals through out the period under investigation.  
To buttress the point of a policy monopoly being secured by the Judiciary 
Committees, Figures 4.6 and 4.7 present a Herfindahl index score for each chamber. A 
Herfindahl index score is calculated by squaring the proportion of committees holding 
referrals in the policy realm and then summing the squares of those proportions. The 
result is an index score that ranges from zero to one. A score close to zero indicates 
referrals are spread out among a large number of committees, while a score of one 
indicates that a single committee holds all the referrals (Worsham, 2004). As previously 
stated, and as indicated in the figures, the Judiciary Committee in both chambers 
dominated the referral of introductions, but again this control tends to vary during periods 
of competition—such as that of the early 1960s and the mid-1990s. 







































































































The preceding charts and observations provide a measure of the level of activity, 
what receives attention on the civil rights agenda and who maintains jurisdictional control 
over the referral of introductions. At the macro-level we can surmise that a relatively low 
number of issues comprise the early postwar civil rights agenda. Accordingly, these 
issues include prohibiting the practice of employment discrimination and the 
advancement of civil rights amendments. When the 1960s swept through—characterized 
by the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965, the level of attention 
to civil rights and the degree of committee competition was at its apex. While the level of 
attention and competition soon relapsed, this particular juncture served as the foundation 
for the mix of issues that appeared on the agenda over the next three decades.  
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That said, I will now turn my attention to the agricultural agenda and compare its patterns 
of activity to that of civil rights. 
  
Mapping the Agenda of Agriculture 
 
Following the same format used for examining civil rights, exploring the agricultural 
agenda adheres to the same line of questions: “What receives attention?” and “Who has 
jurisdictional control?” As was this case for civil rights, the first question examines the 
level of activity and what topics receive the most attention on the agenda, whereas the 
second question assesses committee competition and policy monopoly. To follow then, is 
a presentation of descriptive graphs and tables, which seek to clarify the two 
aforementioned questions. Similar to the previous section, presenting data graphically is 
effective because as the old saying goes “a picture tells a thousand words.” 
 
What Receives Attention?  
To begin, the agricultural agenda is much different in comparison to civil rights. All told, 
there were a total of 2,656 introductions (Table 4.2). There were 1,948 in the House and 
708 in the Senate. Particularly, agriculture receives far more attention in the early 1940s 
than does civil rights. Much of this is due to the nexus between agriculture and the war, 
and Congress’ interest in meeting military demands at home and abroad. However, as 
indicated by Figure 4.8, agriculture received scant attention during the immediate post 
war years. The level of attention and congressional intervention diminished during this 
period because the years following the war brought stability and a piece of prosperity to 
the farming community (Hurt, 1994).  
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Table 4.2: Agriculture Bill Introductions By Session 
Year Session Introductions 
1939 76 48 
1941 77 140 
1943 78 60 
1945 79 7 
1947 80 9 
1949 81 19 
1951 82 10 
1953 83 37 
1955 84 85 
1957 85 290 
1959 86 174 
1961 87 75 
1963 88 82 
1965 89 130 
1967 90 78 
1969 91 103 
1971 92 90 
1973 93 81 
1975 94 113 
1977 95 192 
1979 96 148 
1981 97 112 
1983 98 101 
1985 99 165 
1987 100 109 
1989 101 79 
1991 102 47 
1993 103 34 
1995 104 21 
1997 105 17 































































As illustrated in Figure 4.8, things soon changed when attention to agriculture 
peaked in 1957-58 during the 85th Congress. As described in Chapter Two, this increase 
in attention is illustrative of Congress’ interest in addressing the issue of surplus 
production. By 1961, the level of activity had tailed off and remained relatively steady for 
the next fifteen years. Not until 1977 during the 95th Congress is there a noticeable 
change in activity. After the level of activity drops and rises over the next ten years, the 
end of 1987 marked the beginning of a steady decline in the attention to agriculture. In 
particular, by the end of the analysis period, agriculture received very little attention. The 
fluctuating level of activity and the issues that are shaping the agenda can be elucidated 
















Figures 4.9 (House) and 4.10 (Senate) illustrate the topics that receive attention on 
the agenda in both chambers. Evident in the House, price supports dominate the 
agricultural agenda during the early 1940s. Although proposals dealing with cotton and 
disaster assistance are present, price supports makeup 70% of the topics on the agenda 
from 1940-1945. Comparably in the Senate, loans, price supports and cotton receive most 
of the attention—with loans and price supports comprising 67% of the topics on the 
agenda. Indicative of the dramatic shift in activity, the level of attention to price supports 
in 1957 during the 85th Congress skyrockets in the House, and marginally increases in the 
Senate. This is realized because during this time Congress regarded price supports as the 
means to addressing the surplus production that was created during the war years. In 
addition to price supports, proposals centering on family farms and cotton related issues 
receive attention in the House as well. However unlike the House, the Senate also 
introduces loan proposals on the agenda. In essence, as Figures 4.9 and 4.10 indicate, the 
mid-1950s is characterized by an increase in issue topics, with price supports, cotton, and 
loan proposals receiving the majority of the attention. 
What is interesting from Figure 4.10 (House) is that by 1969, at the start of the 
91st Congress, the topic of price supports falls from the agenda. This is primarily the 
result of the decrease in partisan politics over prices supports and agricultural policy as 
described by Hurt (1994). Over the next five years loan proposals comprise 73% of the 
topics on the agenda—receiving most of the attention in the House. In comparison, the 
Senate introduces a mix of issues, but similar to the House, farm loans remain the 








































































An interesting phenomenon illustrated in Figures 4.9 and 4.10 is the panoply of 
issues that emerge during 1975 through 1980. During this five year span the agricultural 
agenda in both chambers consists of an array of topics involving proposals dealing with 
disaster assistance, family farms, farm insurance, and cotton. In part, this increase in the 
number of topics can be attributed to the congressional reforms that took place between 
1971 and 1977. Browne (1995) suggests that such reform decentralized committee power 
and as a result opened the door for the introduction of a mix of policy issues.  




































































Note that while the agenda in both chambers consist of a variety of topics, introductions 
pertaining to farm loans still comprise over 40% of the issues on the agenda. In sum, as 
the general level of activity declines throughout the 1990s, the mix of topics fades from 
the agenda. Now that I have assessed the composition of topics on the agenda, the next 
question involves jurisdictional control over legislative referrals. 
 
Who has Jurisdictional Control? 
Research suggests that legislative referrals are consequential to agenda setting because it 
illustrates the presence of committee competition and policy monopoly (King, 1997; 
Baumgartner and Jones, 1993). Thus, the occurrence of such competition can 
consequently disrupt subsystem arrangements and policy equlibria (Worsham 1997; 
Talbert, Jones and Baumgartner, 1995; Baumgartner and Jones, 1993) Therefore, the 
analysis of legislative referrals is important because it illustrates a committee’s ability to 
control the agenda.  
An interesting illustration in Figures 4.11 and 4.12 is the presence of mild 
competition between 1958 and 1989. In examining this trend, it is apparent that 
competition occurs in two separate time periods. The lesser of the two arises between 
1958 and 1967. During this juncture 10% of the introductions are not referred to the 
Agriculture Committees. Notably, the Ways and Means and Post Office Committees are 
the primary venue, which receives these introductions. In particular, the introductions 
referred to the Ways and Means involve proposals related to farm income issues such as 
taxable income of farmers. Introductions referred to the Post Office Committee concern 
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Perhaps the most telling trend in the graphs is the second period of competition, 
which exists from 1972 through 1988. As far as the research is concerned, this time span 
is particularly interesting due to the punctuating effects of the congressional reforms 
from 1971-1977, and the rise of the farm crisis from 1981-1986.  During the reform era 
in the House (Figure 4.11) the Ways and Means, Post Office, and the Judiciary 
Committees combined receive a little more than 12% of the referrals during this juncture.  
































































The small number of introductions referred to the Judiciary and Ways and Means involve 
issues pertaining to family farmers, while referrals to the Post Office concern the pay of 
county committees. Aside from Agriculture, the two other committees that receive 
proposals include the Ways and Means and Appropriations. Introductions to the Ways 
and Means involve primarily the farm production of family farmers, while referrals to the 
Appropriations Committee focus on budget issues—pertaining particularly to the Farmers 
Home Administration and soil conservation. Notably, it is fair to postulate that the issue 
and referral of such introductions reflect the troubling times brought about by the farm 
crisis. 
Turning to the Senate (Figure 4.12), the Finance, Post Office, and Judiciary 
Committees are involved in mild competition. For example, during the reform period the 
Finance, Post Office, and Judiciary Committees are referred a little more than 15% of the 
introductions. In particular, the Finance Committee receives most of these referrals—
which center primarily on loan and price support issues. Similar to the House, the Post 
Office Committee in the Senate is also referred proposals concerning the pay of county 
committees. Also similar to the House, the Judiciary Committee receives bills pertaining 
to family farm aid. At the wake of the farm crisis, most of the introductions referred to 
the Finance Committee involve farm loan issues—partially related to recovery taxes. 
Other committees active during this mild period of competition include the Judiciary and 
Banking Committees. Once again, the introductions referred to Judiciary relate to family 
farm issues, whereas referrals to the Banking Committee involve issues of farm income 
such as credit and bankruptcy—concerns that are indicative of the crisis.  
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Although there are periods of minimal policy competition, overall, the Agriculture 
Committee is the dominant institutional venue for the referral of agricultural 
introductions. To confirm the jurisdictional monopoly maintained by the Agriculture 
Committees and the presence of competition, Figures 4.13 (House) and 4.14 (Senate) 
contain Herfindahl index scores for each chamber. As demonstrated by the figures, 
referral of agricultural proposals resides primarily within the jurisdiction of the 
Agriculture Committees. However, during the reform and crisis period mild competition 
emerges, which in turn slightly disrupts the degree of dominance secured by the 
committees. 









































































































I have established that the Agriculture Committees maintain a policy monopoly over the 
referral of introductions throughout most of the analysis period. I have also discovered 
that during shocks to the system, mild committee competition arises. As such, I want to 
assess whether competition and the introductions that escape referral to the Agriculture 
Committee are sponsored by representatives outside the agricultural policy domain (i.e. 
the Agricultural Committee). The following section examines bill sponsorship in both 
chambers during the time period characteristic of mild referral competition (1972-1988). 
This particular time frame is examined because it exhibits the most competition 
throughout the analysis. Using the Congressional Directory I was able to determine 
whether the Chair of the Agriculture committee, the Ranking Minority member of the 
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committee, a Republican in the committee, or a Democrat in the committee introduce 
proposals that escape referral to their committee. All nonmembers who introduce 
proposals are regarded as outsiders. The notion holds that insiders of the policy domain 
(i.e. Agricultural Committee) are less likely to sponsor a gamut of introductions that 
knowingly would be referred to another jurisdiction. As such, I concur with Rosenthal 
(1998, 131) who argues that a “bill will ordinarily be assigned to the committee on which 
the author serves or which he or she chairs.” That said, the preceding gives rise to the 
following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: Introductions that escape referral to the Agriculture Committee are 
less likely to be sponsored by representatives inside the policy domain. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Representatives inside the policy domain are likely to sponsor more 
proposals assigned to the committee than they are to sponsor proposals that 
escape the committee. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Policy-coupled introductions are more likely to be sponsored by 
Democrats than Republican representatives.16 
 
These hypotheses are important to investigate because it helps highlight the origin and 
destination of legislative proposals that challenge policy jurisdiction and subsystem 
autonomy.  
 
 Sponsorship and Committee Competition 
First, I will examine sponsorship in both chambers for all introductions that escape 
referral to the Agriculture Committee from 1972-1988. Afterwards, I will then assess all 
proposals that are assigned to the committee for the same time period. To begin, Tables 
4.3 and 4.4 detail the percentage of bill introductions that are referred outside the 
                                                 
16 As indicated previously in the chapter under the discussion of data collection, a policy-coupled 
introduction is one in which agriculture and civil rights is introduced jointly. For example, a bill title that 
states, “to prohibit discrimination in the delivery of farm loan programs” would be regarded as a policy-
coupled introduction.  
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Agriculture Committee and those who sponsored the largest percentage of such 
introductions.  
 
Table 4.3: House Introductions that escape referral to the Agriculture committee from 1972-1988 
      

















1972 12 5   1  4 
1973 44 14   1 3 10 
1974 22 2     2 
1975 99 22   14 1 7 
1976 24 6   1  5 
1977 116 25   2 2 21 
1978 67 15   6 4 5 
1979 64 27  2 6 5 14 
1980 41 10   4 1 5 
1981 48 23 1  2 7 13 
1982 36 6   1 2 3 
1983 60 13  1 1 1 10 
1984 8 1     1 
1985 68 12   1 1 10 
1986 43 7   2 1 4 
1987 63 21   1 2 18 
1988 12 1   1   
Total 827 210 1 3 44 30 132 
























Table 4.4: Senate Introductions that escape referral to the Agriculture committee from 1972-1988 
 

















1972 3 1     1 
1973 15 2  1  1 1 
1974 10       
1975 20 5   1  4 
1976 7 1   1   
1977 38 6   2  4 
1978 23 6   1  5 
1979 28 9     9 
1980 23 9     8 
1981 26 13 1  2  7 
1982 17 1      
1983 37 6     6 
1984 4       
1985 41 6   5  1 
1986 16 9   3  6 
1987 33 5   1  4 
1988 10 3   1  1 
Total 351 82 1 1 17 1 57 
Percentage  23% 1% 1% 21% 1% 70% 
 
 
As indicated in Tables 4.3 (House) and 4.4 (Senate), there were a total of 1,178 
introductions from 1972-1988. There were 827 in the House and 351 in the Senate. Of 
the 827 in the House, 25% escaped referral to the Agriculture Committee, while 23% of 
the 351 escaped the Agriculture Committee in the Senate. As far as policy entrepreneurs 
are concerned, the committee chair and ranking minority member sponsor 1% of all 
proposals that escape referral to the committees. In particular, Democrats in the House 
sponsor 21% of the introductions that escape referral and 21% in the Senate, whereas 
Republicans sponsor 14% in the House and 7% in the Senate. The majority of 
introductions that escape the Agriculture Committees are sponsored by outsiders at 63% 




On a general level, there are issues topics which both parties tend to sponsor, at 
least based on the introductions. In the House, both Democrats and Republicans sitting on 
the Agriculture Committee sponsor more loan-based proposals—the majority of which 
are referred to the Ways and Means Committee. Probably the most interesting aspect 
regarding the two parties is the fact that during the mid-1970s Democrats sponsored over 
95% of all proposals dealing with family farm issues—the majority of which were 
referred to the Ways and Means Committee. This difference is likely the result of liberal, 
democratic congressmen that were ushered in by the reforms that was described by 
Zelizer (2004) and Sheingate (2001). In the Senate the difference is less dramatic. For 
instance, both parties sponsor loan proposals, however, Democrats tend to sponsor more 
county committee issues, while Republicans introduce more price support proposals.  
 Next, Tables 4.5 (House) and 4.6 (Senate) illustrate the sponsorship of 
introductions assigned to the Agriculture Committee from 1972-1988. As illustrated, 
members within the agricultural domain sponsor more introductions assigned to the 
committee than they do those from outside. For example, the committee chair in the 
House sponsors 3% of the introductions referred to the committee, whereas the ranking 
minority member sponsors 4%. In comparison, the committee chair in the Senate 
sponsors 13% of the introductions referred to the committee, while the ranking minority 
member sponsors 8%. Notably, the committee chair and the ranking minority member in 
both chambers tend to sponsor cotton, price support and loan related proposals. In 
addition, in both the House and Senate, Democrats are more active—sponsoring 33% and 
25% of introductions assigned to the committee. Conversely, Republicans sponsor 17% 
in the House and 18% in the Senate. There is more parity between the two parties in the 
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fact that both Democrats and Republicans sponsor more loan proposals than any other 
topic. Likewise in the Senate, both parties comparably sponsor more loan and price 
support proposals. However, Republicans tend to be slightly more active than Democrats 
in sponsoring cotton related proposals.  
 
Table 4.5: House Introductions assigned to the Agriculture committee from 1972-1988 
 
















1972 12 7 1  1 1 4 
1973 44 30   10 3 17 
1974 22 20   4 8 8 
1975 99 77  8 20 7 42 
1976 24 18   5 3 10 
1977 116 91   23 14 54 
1978 67 52 2  26 6 18 
1979 64 37  2 17 5 13 
1980 41 31 1  17 6 8 
1981 48 25 2 5 8 2 8 
1982 36 30 1 4 12 6 7 
1983 60 47 1 2 15 12 17 
1984 8 7   4 1 2 
1985 68 56 4 1 13 18 20 
1986 43 36 2  12 8 14 
1987 63 42 3 1 16 4 18 
1988 12 11   2 1 8 
Total 827 617 17 23 205 105 268 
Percentage  75% 3% 4% 33% 17% 43% 
 




















Table 4.6: Senate Introductions assigned to the Agriculture committee from 1972-1988 
 
















1972 3 2 1    1 
1973 15 13 3 2  2 6 
1974 10 10 1 1 1 5 2 
1975 20 15 1 2 4 3 5 
1976 7 6  1 1 1 3 
1977 38 32 4 3 11 3 11 
1978 23 17 4 3 4 1 5 
1979 28 19 4  8 4 3 
1980 23 14 3 1 4 2 4 
1981 26 13 5 2 2 1 3 
1982 17 16 1 1 5 3 6 
1983 37 31 4 1 7 8 11 
1984 4 4   1 2 1 
1985 41 35 1 3 7 6 18 
1986 16 7   1  6 
1987 33 28 2 1 8 7 10 
1988 10 7   3 1 3 
Total 351 269 34 21 67 49 98 
Percentage  77% 13% 8% 25% 18% 36% 
 
 Throughout this analysis I have implicitly made reference to the policy coupling 
of civil rights with agriculture issues and have yet to render any information to illustrate 
such an occurrence. Therefore, before concluding this chapter, the following section will 
address this issue by examining the proposals that exhibit coupling. Evidence of this 
amalgam is probably best seen through a discussion detailing the sponsorship, content, 
and fate of the legislation joining together civil rights and agriculture. To simplify the 
discussion I will first briefly present the proposals that never move past committee 
referral. Thereafter, I will examine the proposal that resulted in legislation benefiting 
African American farmers. In part, the following discussion works to form the basis for a 




Policy-coupling and Legislative Entrepreneurs 
 All told, there were a total of seven proposals that exhibited policy coupling. In 1969, 
Congressmen John Hagan (D-GA), Marvin Esch (R-MI), and Leonard Blanton (D-TN), 
who were all outsiders of the policy domain, each sponsored a proposal dealing with the 
issue of prohibiting discrimination in administering crop insurance. After each proposal 
was referred to the Agriculture Committee, no further action was granted to the 
proposals. I contend coupling was not successful during this period due in large part to 
the existence of dominant subsystem politics. It was not until the early 1970s with the 
congressional reforms when this form of politics was diluted. But, it is worth noting that 
each of these proposals surfaced after 1964—again confirming the observations of 
Klinkner and Smith (1999) who suggests the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was the foundation 
for forthcoming civil rights issues and reforms.  
In 1997 Congresswoman Cynthia McKinney (D-GA) also an outsider of the 
policy domain, sponsored a proposal in the House that sought to provide a mechanism for 
addressing certain complaints of discrimination arising out of the administration of 
programs of the USDA. After being referred both to the Judiciary and Agriculture 
Committee, her proposal received no further attention from either committee. In addition, 
in 1997 during the 105th Congress, Congresswoman Eva Clayton (D-NC) a member of 
the Agriculture Committee sponsored a proposal that sought to restructure the Farm 
Service Agency (FSA) county committees to ensure minority representation, and to 
ensure minority farmers could obtain credit and other assistance to maintain their farms. 
During the same year chairman of the Agriculture Committee, Robert Smith (R-OR) 
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introduced a proposal that also sought to reorganize the USDA by combining the FSA 
and the Natural Resources Conservation Service (NRCS) into a single agency within the 
USDA. Not only did Smith’s proposal seek to restructure the agency, but it also included 
provisions to ensure the equitable treatment of socially disadvantaged farmers and 
ranchers. After both proposals were referred to the Agriculture Committee, a hearing was 
granted to discuss the details of both proposals. After the lengthy hearing was concluded, 
no further attention was given to the proposals sponsored by Clayton and Smith. Details 
about the hearing and the witnesses that testified will be discussed in the next chapter.  
The punctuating event of the class action lawsuit that surfaced the previous year 
along with the numerous “listening sessions” on discrimination held by the USDA around 
country throughout 1995-1997, were in part the impetus for the proposals that emerged in 
1997 protecting minority farmers.17 Interestingly enough, each of the aforementioned 
proposals introduced during the 105th Congress that aimed at assisting/protecting black 
farmers was contingent upon reorganizing the USDA. Browne (1995, 151) argues many 
members of Congress view the USDA as integral to national agricultural policymaking. 
Thus, anything that may jeopardize the agency’s ability to remain resourceful and 
influential would seem to be difficult to garner support for, not to mention the resistance 
that would be staged by USDA officials. And if reorganizing the USDA was not going to 
occur, then equality for black farmers would be compromised as well. Moreover, the 
proposals by Clayton and McKinney also had to travel the waters of a Republican 
majority in both the House and Senate Agriculture Committee—which also proved 
contentious.  
                                                 




Success in 1990: Policy Entrepreneurship and the Minority Farmers Rights Act 
Browne (2003, 143) states, “by 1990 complaints from black farmers to their own local 
members of Congress had reached, in one member’s words, “epidemic levels.” Thus, if 
civil rights were going to be successfully attached to agricultural policy, and result in 
legislation, then it appears as though it was going to be formulated and solidified by the 
resilient and collaborative efforts of organized interests and policy entrepreneurs. If 
Browne’s assertion of “epidemic levels” is correct, then it would be rational for some 
member or members of Congress to address or at least attempt to better the circumstances 
of their constituency. King (1997) contends that policy entrepreneurs are not motivated 
solely by elections, but also by instituting good public policy. Kingdon (1995, 123) 
argues that many policy entrepreneurs advocate certain proposals because they want to 
affect the shape of public policy according to the values and or interests they hold. Thus, 
being able to bring forth policy change is an important incentive for many legislative 
entrepreneurs to act.  
Perhaps the most pertinent proposals to this analysis occurred in 1990 during the 
101st Congress. Congressman Mike Espy (D-MS) and Senator Wyche Fowler (D-GA) 
both insiders in the agricultural policy domain, sponsored the House and Senate version 
of Minority Farmers Rights Act, which added an amendment (section 2501) to the Food, 
Agriculture, Conservation, and Trade Act (FACT) of 1990. Congressman Espy gathered 
opinions and information about what the bill should look like during his meeting with 
The Federation of Southern Cooperatives/Land Assistance Fund (FSC/LAF) (Sherrod, 
2004). Provisions included funding for outreach and education; targeting of Farmers 
Home Administration Ownership and Operating Loans; inclusion of more people of color 
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on USDA staff and committees; a registry of minority farmers; and a report on civil 
rights performance and enforcement in all USDA program (Sherrod, 2004). After first 
being introduced by Espy on June 28, 1990, the bill was referred to the House 
Agriculture Committee, which was agreed to by voice vote and was subsequently 
introduced by Senator Fowler on July 19, 1990. After being read twice and assigned to 
the Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry Committee, the amendment passed in the Senate 
by a voice vote on July 26, 1990 and took effect on October 1, 1990 (Thomas.loc.gov). 
As described in Chapter 2, this was the first direct response from Congress that 
authorized money for outreach and technical assistance for low-income farmers and 
ranchers of color. Successfully introducing the Minority Farmers Rights Act was a clear 
illustration of the dynamic and comprehensive structure of the 1990 farm bill described 
by Browne (1995, 43).  
Failed attempts to successfully join civil rights and agriculture are an illustration 
of what Herbert Simon (1983, 84) describes as a “conflict of multiple values.” Simon 
argues that political institutions have a difficult time simultaneously dealing with 
numerous policy issues because the goals underlying these issues are frequently 
represented by conflicting values. This is particularly true when such values center on 
redistributive policymaking as described by Lowi (1969). In addition, each failed attempt 
of policy coupling lends support to the observations of Baumgartner and Jones (1993, 29) 
that no single entrepreneur can unequivocally guarantee that their proposal to address a 
particular problem will be adopted due to the various conflicting interests involved in 
policymaking. Second, the various failed attempts highlight the point made by Browne 
(1995, 58) that the origin of issue initiatives within agricultural policy is biased toward 
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the protection and maintenance of existing programs. Wildavsky (1997) suggests that 
changes to public policy usually occur incrementally, and Browne (1995, 57) asserts this 
is typically the case for agriculture policy.  With this in mind, a policy or program aimed 
at assisting black farmers was less likely to occur as a sweeping reform—particularly if 
doing so meant dismantling an existing agricultural program. Thus, any changes that 
occurred would need to be storied with a larger farm bill—as was the case with the 
Minority Farmers Rights amendment of the 1990 FACT Act   
Notably, successful policy coupling that occurred in 1990 during the 101st 
Congress was the ability of policy insiders Mike Espy and Wyche Fowler to operate in 
“parallel” with one another. This form of processing was initiated at the “micro level” 
because it was first their individual actions that sought to wed civil rights and agriculture, 
not the president, and at the time not the courts.18 As such, I am not looking to confirm 
the existence of a civil rights subsystem as I have for agriculture, but what I argue is that 
the aforementioned instances of policy coupling—particularly successful coupling is an 
indication of what Worsham (1998) suggests as competitive subsystem politics. This is 
illustrated in the fact that civil rights advocates and interests sought to alter the decision-
making venue of agricultural policy by replacing distributive policy with more radically 
redistributive policy (see Worsham 1998, 489). In addition, the ability of Espy and 
Fowler to deal with the controversial issue of amalgamating civil rights and agriculture 
was accommodated by the fact that Democrats were the majority in both the House and 
Senate Agriculture Committees. Moreover, agricultural policymaking during the early 
                                                 
18 The following chapter will detail how activity by black farming interest groups was also instrumental in 
initiating the change carried out by Espy and Fowler.  
84  
 
1990s was also characteristic of bipartisan cooperation, thus opposition by conservative 
Republicans sitting on the Agriculture Committees was less acute.   
Conclusion 
This chapter illustrated which issues on the civil rights and agricultural agenda receive 
attention, and where jurisdictional control and committee competition reside. The 
analysis of introductions sponsored by members of the Agriculture Committee from that 
sponsored by nonmembers helped illustrate policy disequilibria. In addition, by 
examining the sponsorship of policy coupled proposals one gets a feel for issue salience 
in the chamber as a whole, and the legislative entrepreneurs responsible for the framing 
of such proposals.  
In the early years prohibiting employment discrimination was the main issue on 
the civil rights agenda. After the wake of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 the soil became 
fertile for new issues. In the late-1950s throughout the early 1960s attention to civil rights 
peaked, and while the level of activity tailed off in the late 1960s, the agenda became 
more comprehensive for the next three decades. The resulting diversity of issues on the 
agenda—social, economic, and individual rights—provided the Judiciary Committee the 
opportunity to guide the civil rights agenda for some time. 
Similar to civil rights, agriculture in the late 1950s illustrated an overall increase 
in activity. Notably, as the congressional reforms took place from 1971-77, the agenda 
came to mean more things to more people and, once the farm crisis emerged in 1981, a 
larger mix of issues comprised the agenda—not to mention the presence of committee 
competition. While the majority of the bill introductions that escape referral to the 
Agriculture Committee were sponsored by members outside the policy domain, 
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representatives of the Agriculture Committees sponsored the bulk of proposals assigned 
to the committee. Suggesting the period of mild referral competition was in part the effect 
of issue framing by policy entrepreneurs outside the agriculture policy domain. Notably, 
Democrats were more assertive in their entrepreneurial efforts to fuse civil rights and 
agriculture for the betterment of African American farmers.  
It is important to note that even though policy coupling was not always 
successful, it does illustrate the partisan differences that are inherent in agenda setting. 
This confirms the observations by Baumgartner and Jones (1993, 22) who assert, 
Democrats generally stand in favor of the less-favored classes, while Republicans tend to 
support the more affluent. This demarcation of party lines is plausible because scholars 
contend party affiliation matters in the agenda setting of public policy (Box-
Steffensmeier, Arnold, Zorn, 1997; Schiller, 1995; Sinclair, 1989). The next chapter will 
further explore the participants of agenda setting by taking a closer look at congressional 




















Analyzing Agricultural Agenda Setting  
And Efforts of Issue Redefinition 
    
“Any committee may hold hearings on any topic it pleases, even 
those clearly within the jurisdiction of another committee.” 
 - Baumgartner and Jones (1993, 200) 
 
 
The previous chapter suggested that noticeable changes in the agricultural agenda as 
measured by bill introductions, occur as a result of punctuating events. In some instances 
policy coupling raises questions as to whether general legislative interest and activity is 
exhibited by Congress as a whole, or primarily by legislative entrepreneurs. Thus, this 
chapter is the second step in exploring and assessing the agenda of agricultural support 
policy through the examination of legislative hearings.  
Wilkerson, Feeley, Schiereck, and Sue (1999) found that increases in bill 
introductions lead to increases in hearings. With this in mind, this chapter explores 
whether periods of change in the agricultural agenda as measured by bill introduction 
activity, equate to a similar change in hearing activity. This analysis includes both 
legislative and nonlegislative hearings. As important as legislative hearings are to agenda 
setting, nonlegislative hearings are also consequential to the process because they provide 
legislative entrepreneurs an inside route to initiate issue-redefinition by encroaching on 
the established jurisdiction of a particular committee (Talbert, Jones, and Baumgartner 
1995, 383). There are four particular elements I will explore in this chapter concerning 
the agricultural agenda.  
First, I want to assess the overall level of hearing activity in both chambers. 
Similar to bill introductions, this provides a general understanding of the level of 
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attention Congress gives to agricultural policy of special concern to African American 
farmers. This longitudinal approach is beneficial because it highlights whether a change 
in activity corresponds to a particular “punctuating event.” Kingdon (1984) contends that 
such focusing events are important because they have the potential to influence the 
national agenda.  
Second, I will explore the dynamics of policy jurisdiction and policy monopoly. 
By examining which committee or committees hold hearings, and whether hearing 
activity varies according to shocks to the system, I am able to determine whether a 
change in activity is in part conditioned by periods of punctuation, and thus resulting in 
the institutionalization of particular interests in the policy process. Third, I want to 
explore which witnesses participate in hearings—paying close attention to the hearings in 
which civil rights advocates are present. I track witnesses so as to assess the interests who 
tend to dominate the discussion. In part, this discussion serves to highlight the various 
policy-coupled hearings (legislative and nonlegislative) and the legislative entrepreneurs 
that partake in the hearing.  
Finally, I explore whether policy disequilibria caused by punctuating events 
corresponds to a change in legislative outputs. A basic theme of this study is how the 
problems faced by black farmers were exacerbated by the passive and at times 
antagonistic actions of Congress. Ideas about this congressional activity are notable in the 
evolution of agricultural policy and confirmed by mapping the agenda as presented in 
Chapter Four. This chapter is the second step in understanding the dynamic agenda of 






I focus on congressional hearings in this chapter because as prior research suggests, 
hearings can include efforts of issue redefinition as well as attempts to maintain the status 
quo (Hunt, 2002; Tzoumia, 2001; Baumgartner and Jones, 1993).  Sabatier and Jenkins 
Smith (1993) suggest that examining hearings in aggregate form over time is useful in 
identifying pertinent differences in the set of interests active on a particular issue. 
Likewise, Hardin (2002) illustrates hearings are a key method by which Congress gathers 
policy information, and the witnesses who testify exhibit the policy interests that 
Congress is willing to consider. Furthermore, Valerie Hunt (2002, 79) states that in many 
instances congressional entrepreneurs and political actors within a policy subsystem 
utilize hearings as a way to buttress their existence and dominance in particular policy 
jurisdiction, as well as stake claim to new issues. The fact that congressional hearings 
may serve as fact-finding exercises, an assessment of entrepreneurial activity, or a 
barometer of efforts of issue definition, makes the interests who testify at these hearings 
all the more relevant. Therefore, examining hearings over time and across the spectrum 
of congressional committees provides a plausible representation of the interests that 
members of Congress are willing to hear from, and the potential influence they may have 
on the agricultural agenda.  
Utilizing the Congressional Information Index to Committee Hearings and 
Abstracts to Committee Hearings, I was able to track all hearings dealing with the 
following search topics: agricultural credit, agricultural insurance/disaster assistance, and 
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farm income.19  The search focused primarily on these items not only because it provided 
a more refined sense of the agriculture issues of immediate concern to African American 
farmers, but an extensive amount of time and additional resources would have been 
needed to code a more exhaustive list of items.20 To identify a hearing where civil rights 
and agriculture intersect, I employed the same approach performed for bill introductions. 
For example, whenever any of the hearings produced from the aforementioned 
agricultural search topics made reference to the following topics: civil rights, African 
Americans, black Americans, colored people, negro/negroes, race relations, racial 
discrimination, racial segregation, equality along with any related “see also” term, it was 
dully noted as a policy-coupled hearing. This was performed in order to track all hearings 
where agriculture and civil rights explicitly intersect.  
As is the case for most forms of content analysis, there are some gray areas 
involved in the coding process. I tried to follow the “mostly” rule of thumb as discussed 
by Babbie (1998, 314)—meaning what is the content of the material mostly about. For 
example, an abstract about acreage limitation provisions would seem to be mostly about 
farm income, while a hearing about providing assistance for soybean crop losses due to 
natural disasters appears to be mostly about agricultural insurance/disaster relief. As 




                                                 
19 These search items were selected according to the study conducted by the US Commission on Civil 
Rights detailing the plight of African American farmers. The U.S. Commission on Civil Rights. (1982). 
The Decline of Black Farming in America: A Report of the United States Commission on Civil Rights. 
Washington, D.C.: GPO. 




Deciphering Agricultural Hearing Activity 
 
Figure 5.1 indicates the level of activity in both the House and Senate is comparably the 
same. The primary difference between the two chambers is the House conducts more 
hearings by a margin of almost 50%. Up until the mid 1970s the level of activity is 
somewhat sporadic in both chambers, but essentially inconsequential in terms of 
considerable change. However, in 1956 and 1961 there is a marginal increase in the 
House, but not nearly as momentous as the change that occurs during the 1970s and 
1980s in both chambers. Specifically, the House went from holding one hearing in 1972 
to a total of 17 in 1976, while the Senate went from holding no hearings in 1972 to a total 
of 17 in 1976. Notably during this period of increase, 80% of the hearings focused on 
agricultural credit and farm income—particularly on agricultural credit. This variation 
occurs and coincides with the numerous institutional changes associated with the 
“punctuating” congressional reform era from 1971-1977. As research suggests such 
reform decentralized committee power (Davidson and Oleszek, 2004; Ernstes, Outlaw, 
and Knutson, 1997; Browne, 1995) thus allowing for an increase in hearing activity as 
well as jurisdictional struggle (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993).  
Likewise, the early 1980s indicated a rise in activity, particularly in 1983. This 
level of activity corresponds with the emergence of the “farm crisis” that rocked the 
farming community from 1981-1986. The high times that many farmers experienced 
during the 1970s came crashing down during the early 1980s. As a result, scholars 
suggest (Alston, Rucker and Weidenmier, 2000; Cochrane and Runge, 1992) the wake of 





Policy Jurisdiction and Committee Competition  
To further explore the institutional changes associated with the aforementioned 
punctuating events, Figures 5.2 and 5.3 illustrate the degree of competition in both 
chambers. Both figures illustrate the percentage of the total number of hearings held by 
an individual committee across time. This presentation helps highlight the time frame in 
which different committees become active in influencing the agenda. In general, figures 
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5.2 (House) and 5.3 (Senate) illustrate that the Agriculture Committees serve as the 
institutional bulwark of agriculture policy. However, as David King (1997) suggests, 
committee jurisdiction can be rigid and or flexible. Thus, there are instances in which the 
policy equilibria maintained by the Agriculture Committees varies. Both figures confirm 
the work of Baumgartner and Jones (1993), who indicate most punctuating events lead to 

























































Figure 5.2: House Agricultural Hearings: Committee Competition
Foreign Affiars Education & Labor Govt. Operations Govt. Reform
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Figure 5.3: Senate Agricultural Hearings: Committee Competition
Government Affairs Budget Veterans Affairs Commissions Energy
Interior Commerce Finance Small Business Labor & Public Wel.






Confirming the observations of Baumgartner and Jones (1993), Figures 5.2 and 
5.3 illustrate committee competition increases during the reform era (1971-1977) and 
during the farm crisis in the mid 1980s. In 1976 the Agriculture Committee in the House 
held only 29% of the hearings, while over the previous decade it held over 80% of the 
hearings. Similarly, during the early and mid 1980s the policy debate involves ten 
different committees. In comparison, the Senate Agriculture Committee held 59% of the 
hearings in 1976, whereas over the past two decades it held 100% of hearings. 
Throughout the early and mid 1980s, the policy debate involved eight different 
committees attempting to determine the agricultural agenda.  
This increased attention and the number of committees involved illustrates the 
argument of Cobb and Elder (1972, 35) who contend agenda setting, particularly the 
institutional agenda is routinely characterized by the degree of competition between 
sides. Attempts of various committees to determine the agricultural agenda throughout 
the mid 1970s and early 1980s demonstrates the increase in committee activity as 
described by Browne (1995, 7).  Notably, the rise of competition during the reform and 
crisis period coincides with the committee competition present during the referral of bill 
introductions that was discussed in the previous chapter.  
The punctuating events of the reforms and the farm crisis played an important role 
in the agenda of agricultural policy because it disrupted the policy subsystem and 
equilibria maintained by the Agriculture Committees. To buttress this point, Baumgartner 
and Jones (1993, 194) argue that when shocks and disruptions occur to the system, 
established policy subsystems can be vastly diluted. Aside from the disruptions caused by 
punctuating events to the system, the Agriculture Committees maintain a policy 
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monopoly for a majority of the analysis—at least according to the hearings produced by 
the search.  To illustrate the existence of the policy monopoly secured by the Agriculture 
Committees, Figures 5.4 (House) and 5.5 (Senate) contain Herfindahl index scores for 
each chamber. Both figures indicate the Agriculture Committees dominate the policy 
debate, but again during the congressional reform period and the era of farm crisis, 
additional committees attempt to govern the agricultural agenda. 
 
  















































































































































































Hearing activity, as well as various committees attempting to influence the 
agricultural agenda occurred in accordance to shocks to the system. Thus, these 
punctuating events disrupted the equilibria maintained by the Agriculture Committees. 
When congressional attention is raised about a particularly issue, changes in the 
structures of policymaking typically follow suit (Jones and Strahan, 1985). When such 
changes arise, Baumgartner and Jones (1993, 194) state “previously uninvolved groups 
within and outside of the legislature are encouraged to participate; other groups, which 
had been dominant, are structured out of the issue, or they see their own influence vastly 
diluted” (194). With this in mind, the following section seeks to explore the witnesses 
who participate in the policy debate. In doing so, I am interested in examining whether 
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the previously highlighted moments of punctuation result in the introduction of new 
interests in the policy process. 
 
Witness Participation: Who Participates in the Debate? 
 
As previously stated, the interests that appear at congressional hearings reflect the groups 
that members of Congress are likely to hear (Leyden, 1995). Likewise, the majority of 
groups that lobby Congress also testify at congressional hearings (Scholzman and 
Tierney, 1986). Therefore, determining the identity of interests appearing before 
Congress provides a portrait of the various interests seeking to influence the agenda in a 
particular policy realm. 
 
 Witness Activity 
 
Identifying the witnesses present at hearings is accomplished through the use of the 
Congressional Information Service (CIS) Abstracts to Committee Hearings. The CIS 
Abstracts list the institutional or group affiliation of most witnesses. There are rare 
instances in which a witness appears from the local population with no clear institutional 
or group affiliation. Such witnesses are noted and coded as miscellaneous. The coding 
process distinguished between agricultural and non-agricultural witnesses. Furthermore, 
taking into account the primary concern of African American farmers, I also seek to 
ferret out any interest affiliated with civil rights. As such, witnesses are arranged into 
three separate coalitions—agriculture, civil rights, and business/non-agricultural. The 
following indicates the witnesses that comprise each coalition. 
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The Agriculture Coalition includes witnesses affiliated with the USDA, which 
consists of assorted bureaus and subunits such as the ASCS, FmHA, as well as the 
Department itself, agriculture interests groups—which includes the National Grange, 
Farmers Alliance, Farmers Union, the American Farm Bureau Federation, various 
producer associations, cooperative associations (excluding The Federation of Southern 
Cooperatives), legislators from the Midwest and South, as well as individuals identified 
as “farmer” in the Abstracts. Although the interests arrayed within this coalition have 
conflicting/multiple interests, the rationale for categorizing them together follows 
previous research (Worsham, 2004; McCool, 1998; Lowi, 1964; Key, 1964) which 
suggests when a policy discussion turns redistributive in nature, those currently involved 
will seek to limit outsider access in hopes of protecting not only their share of the policy 
pie, but also their current seat at the agenda setting table.  
In order to explicitly identify witnesses representing African American farmers and or 
individuals championing their interests, I thought it was important to create a Civil Rights 
Coalition. This particular coalition includes witnesses affiliated with various civil rights 
organizations and interests, southern church leaders, farmers identified as African 
American, Department of Justice personnel, representatives from 1890 Land-Grant 
Institutions, black farming interest groups, and agency personnel from the Farm Security 
Administration (FSA). As noted in Chapter Two, the FSA was included in this coalition 
because during the 1940s the agency effectively extended agricultural aid to black 
farmers (see Sheingate 2001; Franklin, 1942). 
The third coalition created included a Business Coalition. This coalition was created 
because Brown (1988, 45) points out that business firms and banking interests regularly 
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intervene in agricultural issues while attempting to circumvent agricultural 
subcommittees. Thus, this coalition includes witnesses associated with financial 
institutions (i.e. banking—not part of the farm credit system), and non-agricultural 
businesses and business interests such as the Chamber of Commerce, and multinational 
business firms.  
In order to facilitate the analysis, the following section discusses witness participation 
in two subsequent ways. First, I examine the witnesses that dominate the agricultural 
debate and assess whether witness participation changes during the reform and crisis 
era—making note of any appearances made by civil rights interests. Second, and most 
important, I take a closer look at the various policy coupled hearings—detailing the issue 
discussed, the witnesses and or legislative entrepreneurs that testify, any legislation 




Overall, there were a total of 9,009 witnesses—(5,829 in the House and 3,180 in the 
Senate). In examining both figures 5.6 (House) and 5.7 (Senate), it is apparent that the 
agricultural coalition comprises the majority of witnesses appearing at the hearings from 
1940 to 1998. However as the figures illustrate, there are instances in which non-
agricultural interests participate in the debate. For example, in both chambers business 
and civil rights interests appear between 1940 and 1948. Particularly, the emergence of 
business interests is understandable during this juncture considering the “role of the New 
Deal and World War II in focusing attention on the interrelationship between agriculture 
and business in righting the economy and aiding the war effort” (Worsham 2004, 8). To 
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buttress this point, Zinn (1997, 310) suggests the WW II era was clearly characterized by 
business led cooperation and corporate profits. The civil rights interests that appear 
during this time reflect the support of the Farm Security Administration (FSA) seeking to 
secure funding for the Farm Tenant Act. Unfortunately for black farmers the FSA and the 
programs it administered was terminated by 1948. Civil rights interests appear again in 
the House in 1965 and 1967. In both years civil rights interests such as the National 
Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) appeared in support of the 
war on poverty programs for rural Americans that were being discussed in the 
Agriculture Committee. Although there was no direct mention of discrimination, the 
appearances of civil rights advocates suggest possible questions of inequality in the 







































































Not until the 1970s is there any discernable variation in the witnesses that appear 
before Congress. Again, agricultural interests dominate the debate, but business interests 
tend to enter the discussion, particularly during the reform and farm crisis era. On 
average between 1970 and 1989 business interests makeup approximately 35% of the 
witnesses appearing at hearings in the House, while constituting 30% of witnesses in the 
Senate; whereas during the previous fifteen years, business interests on average 













































of competition that corresponds with the congressional reforms of the 1970s also appears 
to have opened the door to business appearances (Worsham 2004, 8). Particularly, the 
reforms of the 1970s not only decentralized power in standing committees (Lindasy 
2002; Sheingate 2001; Baumgartner and Jones 1993) but it also appears to have loosened 
many subsystem alliances that had previously been established. As such, Sheingate 
(2001, 146) states, “farm legislation in the 1970s reflected a changing political 
environment in Congress: agriculture was losing its power to control the agricultural 
agenda.”  
The business interests that emerged during the 1970s remained present throughout 
the 1980s. As argued throughout the research, when the booming agricultural conditions 
of the 1970s brought on by record level commodity prices, farm incomes, and farmland 
values collapsed, it was clear agricultural was not going to be as prosperous in the 1980s.  
In part, the effects of plunging crop prices, high interest rates, and declining agricultural 
exports helped kindle the farm crisis experienced from1981-1986. As Figures 5.6 and 5.7 
indicate, there is small blip on the radar in which civil rights advocates appear during the 
farm crisis in both chambers, but again they comprise only a small fraction (less than 4%) 
of the witnesses involved at hearings. However, one might suggest such appearances 
indicate efforts to redefine or at least debate agricultural policy in terms of civil rights—a 
topic I explore in the next section.  
Notably, the problems experienced by the farming community due to the crisis 
also spilled over into the private sector, particularly for many banking institutions (aside 
from those of the farm credit system). At the peak of the farm crisis, banks failed across 
rural America at twice the rate that had been experienced during the later years of the 
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Great Depression (Davidson 1996, 56). Considering the agricultural investments of the 
business community (specifically that of the 1970s), it was understandable as to why the 
business community became quite interested in the policy debate. This confirms the 
observation by Brown (1988, 45) that business interests readily look to intervene in 
congressional discussion about agricultural issues. In comparing Figures 5.2 and 5.3 
(committee competition) to Figures 5.6 and 5.7 (witness participation) it is apparent when 
committee competition dies down in the late 1990s, the coalition activity of non-
agricultural interests remain present and increases slightly. This indicates that the 
Agriculture Committees become more accommodating to previously excluded non-
agricultural interests. This reinforces the observations of Browne (1995, 178, 44) who 
suggests the 1990s was an era when the accommodation and introduction of new issues to 
the agricultural agenda was more prevalent. 
 
Policy Coupling: Debating Civil Rights and Agriculture 
 
In general, the previous discussion establishes that civil rights interests were periodically 
present during congressional discussions concerning agricultural support policy. 
However, evidence of an actual discussion of civil rights requires a closer look at those 
hearings. The following section details the various policy-coupled hearings and the 
corresponding committee’s processing of civil rights. I begin this discussion by 
chronologically examining each policy-coupled hearing—which begins in the Senate and 




Farm and Home Foreclosures 
On March 14, 1983 a nonlegislative hearing was held before the Subcommittee on Courts 
of the Senate Judiciary Committee. The hearing, chaired by Robert Dole (R-KS), 
examined the recent increase in farm credit and home mortgage defaults and 
foreclosures.21 David Miller, President of the Ohio Farm Bureau Federation, testified 
against any moratoriums on foreclosures, as well as any mandatory deferred payments of 
interest and principal for one year (Farm and Home Foreclosures, 98th Cong., 1983, 6). 
Miller argued that such actions was harmful because borrowers that could make their 
payments may not make them and, because of this type of situation, use the money for 
other purposes (Farm and Home Foreclosures, 98th Cong., 1983, 6). Miller argued that he 
opposed any kind of moratorium legislation because it encouraged and allowed people to 
unnecessarily take advantage of it. Instead, Miller noted that a better approach would be 
to improve the services of the FmHA. Specifically, Miller recommended that the FmHA 
revise their farm loan policies and procedures so they do not encourage loan deferral. 
Much of the debate by members of the agricultural coalition illustrated their disapproval 
of moratoriums and deferrals of interest.   
 The next witnesses to appear before the subcommittee included members from the 
civil rights coalition. Reverend Shearin Morris, Baptist clergyman from Betie, North 
Carolina and John Garland, Executive director for Legal Services of the Coastal Plains, 
testified that black farm owners in North Carolina were losing their farms due to the 
effects of racial discrimination. Mr. Garland noted that in the first congressional district 
in North Carolina, there was a 79% decline in the number of black full-time farmers 
                                                 
21 The argument could be made that the hearing in the Senate in 1983 was not necessarily indicative of 
policy coupling. However, the fact that individuals from the civil rights coalition discuss the issue explicitly 
in the context of racial discrimination and black farmers qualifies it for such designation. 
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between 1954 and 1983 (Farm and Home Foreclosures, 98th Cong., 1983, 30). 
“According to the North Carolina Division of Public Policy, [this] will mean by the end 
of the century there will be no black-owned farms in the state of North Carolina,” said 
Garland (Farm and Home Foreclosures, 98th Cong., 1983, 30). Particularly, the brief 
testimony by Reverend Morris and John Garland was an attempt to debate home 
mortgages and farm foreclosures in the context of civil rights and discrimination. 
Considering the committee’s lack of response to their testimony, it appeared as though 
their concerns fell on deaf ears. Although Morris and Garland may not have garnered 
immediate interest from the committee, Schattschneider (1960) suggests policy losers 
attempt to expand the scope of an issue in hopes of persuading non-participants to view 
the issue from their perspective. Perhaps this will occur, only time will tell.  
The last panel of participants to testify included Frank Naylor, representing the 
USDA, Carl Fredrickson, representing the Farm Credit Administration, and James 
Jackson, board member of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board. In general, each witness 
outlined the various operations of the Farm Credit System, and detailed the causes of 
economic decline in the agricultural sector as it related to farm loan losses and 
foreclosures. Similar to the argument made by David Miller, Frank Naylor emphasized in 
his testimony that moratoriums and deferments would be counterproductive and harmful 
to the overall agricultural credit picture, and the ability and fairness of the farmers in the 
farming business (Farm and Home Foreclosures, 98th Cong., 1983). Particularly, Carl 
Fredrickson asserted the best approach to strengthening agricultural income was by 
aggressively expanding export markets (Farm and Home Foreclosures, 98th Cong., 1983, 
89). James Jackson also opposed the idea of moratoriums because as he argued such 
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provisions would unfavorably affect the national credit market, as well as individual 
savings. Overall, the hearing in the Senate and the debate over moratoriums and 
foreclosures overshadowed concerns of civil rights and discrimination. An interesting 
aspect about this hearing is the fact that no farmers suffering foreclosure were asked to 
testify, and moreover the hearing took place in the Judiciary Committee. This point 
illustrates that farm banks utilized the Judiciary Committee to avoid the interests of 
farmers supporting moratoriums; thereby limiting the supply of information as described 
by (Jones, Baumgartner, and Mare, 2005). A little more than a year would pass before the 
Judiciary Committee in the House became the venue where civil rights and agriculture 
were discussed. 
 
Civil Rights Enforcement Record of the Department of Agriculture 
On September 26, 1984 a nonlegislative hearing was held before the Subcommittee on 
Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Judiciary Committee. The crux of the 
hearing chaired by Don Edwards (D-CA) focused exclusively on black farmers’ access to 
credit under the FmHA farm credit programs. Of the ten witnesses that appeared, nine 
represented the interests of black farmers, while Alma Esparza, director of the Office of 
Equal Opportunity, represented the USDA. 
 The witnesses from the civil rights coalition opened by criticizing the USDA’s 
rural lending program by alleging that the FmHA had discriminated against minority 
applicants by refusing to process their loan applications for federal funding. Witnesses 
such as Jeanine Kleimo, with the Housing Assistance Council, indicated to the committee 
that the presence of more minorities in loan-making positions would help lessen the sense 
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of intimidation felt by many minority borrowers who apply for Farmers Home programs 
(Civil Rights Enforcement Record of the Department of Agriculture, 98th Cong., 1984, 6). 
Probably the most profound testimony came from Timothy Pigford, a farmer who was 
representing concerned farmers of North and South Carolina. Pigford’s testimony 
illustrated the problems he and other black farmers experienced trying to operate a 
farming business that must deal with the effects of discrimination. Pigford explained to 
the committee that due to the fact that many black farmers specialize in only one crop, 
the occurrence of a drought would wipe out a farmer’s income, which consequently 
prohibits he or she from paying back their loans (Civil Rights Enforcement Record of the 
Department of Agriculture, 98th Cong., 1984) Pigford added that unfortunately the FmHA 
has “continuously denied farmers the credit or the funding to go and invest in areas to 
make a better crop” (Civil Rights Enforcement Record of the Department of Agriculture, 
98th Cong., 1984, 82). Adding to Pigford’s argument was Representative George Brown 
(D-CA) who provided testimony criticizing the USDA’s inadequate and failed attempts 
to enforce civil rights compliance. “The Farmers Home Administration, one of the largest 
sources of civil rights complaints, is in no position to enforce civil rights compliance,” 
said Brown (Civil Rights Enforcement Record of the Department of Agriculture, 98th 
Cong., 1984, 86). 
Alma Esparza, Equal Opportunity director of the USDA, sought to curtail the 
negative onslaught against the USDA by pointing out how the USDA’s initiatives to 
comply with civil rights laws have always been understood by the agency. Esparza 
testified that the USDA was making conscious steps to comply with all civil rights 
regulations, including efforts to encourage minority employment. Esparza stated that the 
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employment of minorities has increased 15.2 percent from 1980 to 1983. And while 
additional steps need to be taken, Esparza asserted efforts are already underway (Civil 
Rights Enforcement Record of the Department of Agriculture, 98th Cong., 1984, 98). In 
general, Mr. Esparza’s testimony sought to debunk allegations of discrimination by 
highlighting the institutional mechanisms and procedures in place seeking to promote 
justice and equality within the FmHA.  
The last panel of witnesses, also from the civil rights coalition, included the 
president from the Emergency Land Fund, a representative from the Rural Study Group, 
and two different attorneys. Notably, the witnesses continued to reiterate allegations of 
discrimination and inequities of the FmHA’s assistance to black farmers—particularly 
against black farmers in Alabama. Joseph Brooks, president of the Emergency Land Fund 
contended that the FmHA practice of making grossly inadequate loans to black farmers 
created a general pattern of disparity in the lending practices between black and white 
farm applicants (Civil Rights Enforcement Record of the Department of Agriculture, 98th 
Cong., 1984, 139). Brooks suggested throughout his testimony that as long as the the 
FmHA continued to encourage delinquent black farmers to sell their land, a positive and 
supportive relationship could not be developed between the two parties. 
 The competition that had shaped up between civil rights advocates and the sole 
representative of the USDA was a one sided debate—dominated chiefly by the interests 
supporting black farmers. The hearing illustrates that it is outsiders who first try their 
hand at combining civil rights with agricultural policy. Such attempts highlight how 
various individuals from the civil rights coalition functioned as policy entrepreneurs 
driven by their values and ideology about influencing the shape of policy as described by 
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Kingdon (1995). In addition, the Judiciary Committee’s accommodation of civil rights 
interests illustrates the observations by King (1997, 143) that jurisdictional fragmentation 
allows access points for groups to pursue their policy endeavors. Thus, the hearing for 
black farmers was not only a time to disclose allegations of discrimination, but it was a 
venue to garner support against the decline of black farmers. As important as the 
discussion may have been, Congress did not hold additional hearings on the issue until 
the summer of 1990. 
 
Decline of Minority Farming in the U.S.  
On July 25, 1990 a nonlegislative hearing was held before the Government Information, 
Justice, and Agriculture Subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations. The 
hearing chaired by Robert Wise (D-WV) mirrored that conducted by the Judiciary 
Committee in the sense that it also focused on allegations of discrimination by the 
FmHA. The first to testify at the hearing was Congressman Mike Espy (D-MS). Espy 
vehemently explained the FmHA had been consistently discriminating against black 
farmers in Mississippi for over the past decade and without change black farmers will 
continue to face such injustice. Espy asserted the USDA had turned a blind eye and 
allowed the FmHA to routinely deny agricultural credit to minority farmers solely on the 
grounds of race. Espy argued without continued oversight the FmHA would continue to 
operate in an inefficient and discriminating fashion. “Once efforts have made to eliminate 
the problem, I think it is important for efforts to be continually maintained to guard 
against [discrimination] in the future,” said Espy (Decline of Minority Farming in the 
U.S., 101st Cong., 1990).  
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Testimony by four other supporters for black farmers also railed against the 
FmHA by testifying how the agency had been unresponsive to Freedom of Information 
Act requests regarding discrimination complaints. Advocates justified their claims by 
introducing the Commission on Civil Rights 1982 report, which criticized the USDA’s 
treatment of black farmers. Advocates pointed to the report’s discussion of occurrences 
of credit discrimination by local FmHA officials in North Carolina, Alabama, and 
Mississippi. David Harris, Executive Director of the Land Loss Prevention Project, 
discussed accounts of discrimination by the FmHA. Harris provided documented cases 
where local offices of the FmHA refused to process applications, blatantly refused to 
agree to any restructuring agreements, denied farmers extra copies of various loan 
documents, and readily badmouthed minority farmers that came into the office for 
assistance. Such allegations presented by Harris and other members of the civil rights 
coalition clearly identified the FmHA as a haven for discrimination. Advocates suggested 
the USDA should not only aggressive investigate activity of inequality, but also remove 
those employees responsible for discrimination.  
 Coming to the succor of the USDA was La Verne Ausman, administrator of the 
FmHA and Evelyn White, acting director for the Office of Advocacy and Enterprise. 
Both witnesses testified in defense of the FmHA’s loan, training, and technical assistance 
programs. They explained the FmHA is charged with assisting family farmers who are 
unable to obtain needed credit from commercial lenders at rates and terms they can afford 
(Decline of Minority Farming in the U.S., 101st Cong., 1990). Ausman suggested without 
their services many small-scale farmers would have a very difficult time obtaining any 
credit at all. Both Ausman and White reiterated throughout their testimony how the 
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limited resource farm operating program and the targeted loan program are two programs 
that have and will continue to be beneficial in assisting socially disadvantaged, minority 
farmers.  
Interestingly enough, the testimony by Ausman and White was basically a 
presentation of the programs available to all farmers. Neither witness sought to confirm 
the allegations brought forth by Harris’s testimony. In fact, their testimony repudiated 
any agency wrong doing concerning loan disbursement. To illustrate this point, Ausman 
stated, “A look at our loan activity shows loans are disbursed among minorities in a 
pattern generally matching the farm population” (Decline of Minority Farming in the 
U.S., 101st Cong., 1990, 172). Overall, the hearing in 1990 was significant because it 
provided a forum to discuss agricultural policy and the USDA in terms of civil rights. 
This is significant because this hearing as well as that held by the Judiciary Committee, 
illustrates the agenda setting option “encourage it to happen,” referenced by Ripley 
(1985). Under this particular option government provides groups access to define 
problems so that the policymaking process does not consistently displace less affluent 
interests. Unfortunately this access was short-lived. It would be seven years before 
another hearing was held explicitly examining the USDA’s treatment of black farmers.   
 
Treatment of Minority and Limited Resource Producers by the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture 
 
On March 19th, 1997 a nonlegislative hearing was held before the Subcommittee on 
Department Operations, Nutrition, and Foreign Agriculture of the Committee on 
Agriculture. Previously, civil rights and agriculture were debated in the Judiciary and 
Government Operations Committees, now discussions are occurring within the 
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agricultural domain. The hearing sought to examine allegations of USDA agricultural 
credit discrimination against black farmers. First to testify before Chairman Bob 
Goodlatte (D-VA) was Robert Robinson, director of Food, Agriculture Issues and 
Economic Development of the General Accounting Office (GAO).  Contrary to the 
claims of discrimination made by black farmers, Robinson’s testimony was less critical 
of the actions of the USDA.  
Specifically, Robinson’s testimony presented the findings from a report by the 
GAO titled “Efforts to Achieve Equitable Treatment of Minority Farmers.” In describing 
the purpose and findings of the report, Robinson explained that the records of the FSA 
from 1995-1996 did not illustrate a pattern of discrimination as argued by many 
advocates for black farmers. After referencing various statistical figures and percentages 
documented in the report, Robinson concluded his testimony with an assertion that most 
black farmers would refuse to agree with. “Despite the higher disapproval rates for 
minority farmers, decisions to approve or disapprove applications were supported by 
information in the files. And FSA staff appeared to apply decision-making criteria to 
minority and non-minority applicants in a similar fashion,” said Robinson (Treatment of 
Minority and Limited Resource Producers by the U.S. Department of Agriculture, 105th 
Cong., 1997, 7). Although Robinson struggled to answer various questions posed by the 
committee concerning the issue of loan discrimination, he refused to waver on the 
findings of the GAO’s report. 
 The GAO report presented by Robinson was rejected by the testimony by David 
Harris Jr., Executive Director of the Land Loss Prevention Project. Harris introduced 
information from the 1982 report of the United States Commission on Civil Rights, 
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which highlighted the inequitable delivery of services by the USDA against minority 
farmers. Overall, Harris’s testimony highlighted the discriminating acts and practices 
committed by FSA employees in local offices in North Carolina and Mississippi. Harris 
continued to reiterate that discrimination has been the primary cause for the decline in 
African American farmers. The detailed testimony by Harris introduced solutions to 
address the problems of discrimination and neglect. Such recommendations included 
strict regulations to compel local officials to obey the law, adequate and equitable 
outreach to all black farmers, and sanctions to all USDA employees who fail to uphold 
these standards (Treatment of Minority and Limited Resource Producers by the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture, 105th Cong., 1997). Harris concluded his testimony by urging 
Congress to require the USDA to monitor its civil rights performance on a scheduled and 
routine basis.  
On July 17th the hearing resumed with testimony from Secretary of Agriculture, 
Daniel Glickman, and Lloyd Wright, a representative from the USDA Office of Civil 
Rights. At the outset, the chairman stated discrimination by the USDA could not and 
would not be tolerated. Glickman asserted it was the policy of the USDA that every 
farmer should have fair and equal access to all federal programs administered by the 
USDA (Treatment of Minority and Limited Resource Producers by the U.S. Department 
of Agriculture, 105th Cong., 1997, 94). Both Glickman and Wright responded to the 
chairman’s opening statements by testifying that the agency has been working to address 
all forms of discrimination against USDA employees and minority farmers (Treatment of 
Minority and Limited Resource Producers by the U.S. Department of Agriculture, 105th 
Cong., 1997, 95). Glickman also indicated that a three-person panel was used to 
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investigate all alleged reprisals and make binding recommendations when warranted. 
When asked about the discrimination of loan processing, Glickman responded, “I’ve also 
ordered that loan processing continue on accounts where a discrimination complaint is 
pending. Standing up for your rights should not disqualify someone from seeking a farm 
loan” (Treatment of Minority and Limited Resource Producers by the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture, 105th Cong., 1997, 95). Mr. Wright also responded to the chairman’s 
question regarding discrimination by indicating that the USDA was in the process of 
hiring economists and investigators to determine the consistency of discrimination 
experienced by black farmers, and to what extent they had been hurt by USDA policies. 
Glickman and Wright’s testimony highlighted the administrative steps and actions made 
by the USDA to address allegations of discrimination and inequality. As such, their 
testimonies not only implicated the USDA, but it validated the claims of discrimination 
made by black farmers over the past decade. 
Last to testify at the hearing was Congresswoman Maxine Waters (D-CA) and 
Congressman John Conyers (D-MI). Both expressed their frustration with the USDA, 
calling for immediate measures to resolve the numerous complaints of credit 
discrimination. Waters argued for a system of guidelines intended to “get these claims out 
of the way and off the books, and we need to do [so] very aggressively” (Treatment of 
Minority and Limited Resource Producers by the U.S. Department of Agriculture, 105th 
Cong., 1997, 124). At one point during the hearing Congresswoman Waters had gotten so 
abrasive with one of her statements that the chairman had to ask her not to continue with 
the interjection. Notably, Representative Conyers acknowledged his concern in the issue 
by requesting the committee hold a hearing where only members of the farm 
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communities that have been subjected to discrimination appear to testify. Conyers 
advocated efforts to not only protect, but also strengthen the minority farming 
community. Conyers suggested to the committee that without congressional assistance 
African American farmers will continue to disappear (Treatment of Minority and Limited 
Resource Producers by the U.S. Department of Agriculture, 105th Cong., 1997).  
The hearing that took place in the Agriculture Committee was significant because 
it signaled the importance of an issue and, it also illustrated how legislative 
entrepreneurs, Maxine Waters and John Conyers sought to define agriculture in terms of 
civil rights. As described by (Wawro, 2001; Fenno, 1973) the efforts of Waters and 
Conyers highlight their motivation for “good public policy” aimed at addressing 
discrimination against black farmers. Legislative entrepreneurs utilize relevant 
information to learn about existing policy and to push forward policy recommendations 
in that area (Wawro, 2001; King, 1997). As such, the hearing allowed Maxine Waters and 
John Conyers the opportunity to express the importance of devising a new system to 
address all unsettled claims of discrimination. 
 
Civil Rights Legislation and Other Issues 
On October 23, 1997 the House Committee on Agriculture held a legislative hearing to 
consider proposals H.R. 2185 and H.R. 2692. H.R. 2185 introduced by Eva Clayton (D-
NC), sought to protect the civil rights of black farmers by revising the structure of the 
FSA county committees. H.R. 2692 introduced by chairman of the committee Bob Smith 
(R-OR), primarily looked to combine the FSA and the NRCS into a single agency within 
the USDA. In addition, it also included provisions regarding discrimination against 
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socially disadvantaged farmers. Notably, the importance of this hearing is the fact it is 
occurring within the subsystem.  
 As was the case earlier, first to testify was Secretary of Agriculture, Daniel 
Glickman. He began by expressing his support to resolve all sources of discrimination 
against African American farmers, arguing that the presence of more women and 
minorities on state committees, along with the resolution of some 350 employment 
discrimination complaints, was proof that the USDA was serious about discrimination.  
“The bottom line is that we have taken just about all the administrative actions we can to 
improve our civil rights record. It’s gotten us off to a good start, but we have not 
completed the course,” said Glickman (Civil Rights Legislation and Other Issues, 105th 
Cong., 1997, 47). After explaining the new administrative policies intended to root out 
discrimination, Glickman argued against combining NRCS and the FSA into a single 
agency within the USDA. Specifically, Glickman testified that the USDA was currently 
in the midst of some very dramatic changes related to the 1994 Reorganization Act, and 
another layer of change would be detrimental to the agency’s ability to effectively 
implement federal farm programs. Glickman argued that America’s farmers and ranchers 
need a strong Natural Resource Conservation Service and a strong Farm Service Agency. 
Glickman asserted that both agencies perform critical and unique functions, which should 
not be mashed together (Civil Rights Legislation and Other Issues, 105th Cong., 1997, 
48). In general, Glickman’s testimony illustrated how the USDA resisted having to 
undergo the organizational changes suggested by either proposal. 
Gerald Vap, President of the National Association of Conservation Districts, who 
represented the National Association of State Conservation Agencies, supported 
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Glickman’s testimony arguing that both bills cloud the distinct mission of each agency. 
Vap suggested it was paramount the USDA maintain a separate and distinct natural 
resources and environment mission area because it helps farmers, ranchers and others 
meet their land management needs in an environmentally responsible manner (Civil 
Rights Legislation and Other Issues, 105th Cong., 1997). Aside from expressing 
discontent with both proposals—particularly H.R.2692, Vap’s testimony commended 
Secretary Glickman’s progress to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the USDA. 
Lawrence Lucas, President of the USDA Coalition of Minority Employees, also opposed 
the organizational changes included in H.R. 2692. Lucas explained the Act did not 
provide the Secretary the authority to immediately remove those employees who had 
been discriminating in administering farm credit programs, nor did it allow changes in 
counties where discrimination was a problem (Civil Rights Legislation and Other Issues, 
105th Cong., 1997). Specifically, Lucas felt the Act lacked the teeth necessary to 
fundamentally address the issue of discrimination. As Lucas saw it, additional 
organizational changes would only make a bad situation worse. 
The final panel of witnesses to testify represented the interests of African 
American farmers. Various witnesses such as David Harris, Executive Director of the 
Land Loss Prevention Project, presented information summarizing the multitude of issues 
and problems hindering the civil rights compliance and enforcement by USDA agencies. 
The most interesting aspect of Harris’s testimony was his criticism of Chairman Smith’s 
proposal—H.R. 2692. As indicated, Smith’s proposal primarily involved merging the 
NRCS and the FSA into a single agency within the USDA. In addition, there were also 
provisions in the Act intended to benefit socially disadvantaged farmers. In his 
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presentation, Harris asserted that the substitute language in Smith’s proposal in essence 
undercut the authority of the Office of Civil Rights and limited the Secretary’s discretion 
in developing effective mechanisms to address civil rights issues. In part, the points made 
by Harris basically mirrored the argument made by Lawerence Lucas.  
Representatives from the Black Farmers Agriculturalist Association (BFAA) and 
the National Black Farmers Association (NBFA) thanked Congresswoman Eva Clayton 
for her proposal to address the issue of discrimination, suggesting bipartisan support was 
needed to truly address the issue (Civil Rights Legislation and Other Issues, 105th Cong., 
1997, 104). The hearing concluded with Gary Grant, BFAA president, and John Boyd, 
NBFA president expressing their concern over the loss of black-owned farms (Civil 
Rights Legislation and Other Issues, 105th Cong., 1997, 108).  
The hearing held on October 23, 1997 within the agricultural subsystem, clearly 
illustrates the top-down theory of agenda setting and government policy. This approach 
to agenda setting views major policy initiatives, recommendations, and challenges 
deriving from government officials and policy communities (Studlar, 1990; Anderson, 
1984). For example, proposals to reorganize the USDA originated from members within 
the agricultural domain, and resistance to these proposals was expressed from the policy 
community—primarily those who felt disadvantaged by the reorganization. In addition, 
legislative action to restructure the USDA highlights the “make it happen” option of 
agenda setting referenced by Ripley (1985, 107). As attempted by Eva Clayton and Bob 






Each of the policy-coupled hearings presented illustrate the efforts to define agricultural 
policy in terms of civil rights. For the most part, the three different committees that held 
policy-coupled hearings discussed agricultural support policy in relation to the 
discrimination black farmers experienced from the FmHA in applying for agricultural 
credit. The subtle variation that exists in comparing these hearings is not so much the 
chamber or which committee holds the hearing, as it is the type of hearing being held. In 
terms of witness participation, the single (policy coupled), bill-referral hearing held by 
the House Agriculture Committee tended to be slightly more balanced in the selection of 
witnesses than the other four nonlegislative hearings. For example, as indicated in Table 
5.1, the bill-referral hearing in 1997 during the 105th Congress illustrates that of the 
eleven witnesses testifying, five represented the interests of black farmers. In contrast, the 
nonlegislative hearing also held during the 105th Congress by the House Agriculture 
Committee before the Subcommittee on Department Operations, Nutrition, and Foreign 
Agriculture illustrates that of the ten witnesses that testifying, eight represented and or 
supported the interests of black farmers.  
 
Table 5.1: 1997 Policy-Coupled Hearings: Witness Comparison 
 
Witnesses (1997) Legislative Hearing
H.R. 2185 & H.R. 2692 
(1997) Non-legislative Hearing 
Agriculture 6 2 




Although this is only one illustration it does confirm the conclusions of Talbert, Jones 
and Baumgartner (1995, 392) who argue in most instances bill-referral hearings are 
typically more balanced in terms of the witnesses that testify. In contrast, “committee 
leaders [more readily] stack the list of witnesses in nonlegislative hearings to ensure that 
a certain viewpoint is heard” (Talbert, Jones, and Baumgartner 1995, 401).  
When analyzing the period of congressional reforms (1971-1977) and the farm 
crisis (1981-1986) neither punctuating event necessarily resulted in the introduction of 
civil rights advocates appearing at hearings. Aside from the policy coupled hearing in the 
Senate in 1983 and the House in 1984, continued debates about civil rights and 
agricultural policy occurred primarily in the 1990s—specifically in 1990 and 1997. 
Particularly, in 1997 during the 105th Congress, the civil rights coalition in the House 
comprised 26% of witnesses showing up at hearings (see figure 5.6). This marginal 
percentage change is pertinent because during the six previous years (91-96) civil rights 
advocates did not appear at any of the hearings. More than likely this increase is due to 
the fact the influential class-action lawsuit by black farmers was filed approximately six 
months prior to the start of the 105th Congress (1997-1998). Couple this with numerous 
“listening sessions” on discrimination held by the USDA around the country throughout 
1995-1997 and consequently the level of attention increases, thus spurring additional civil 
rights advocates to enter the fray. And while the punctuating events of the congressional 
reforms and the farm crisis may not have opened the door to civil rights advocates, such 
events did however disrupt the policy equilibria maintained by the Agriculture 
Committees and as a result triggered corresponding legislation.  
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When comparing the levels of hearing activity surrounding the moments of 
punctuation between 1975 and 1991, we see it corresponds to major pieces of agricultural 
legislation. As illustrated in Figure 5.8, the significant peak in hearing activity in the 95th 
Congress is accompanied by the Agricultural Act of 1977. A key element of the Act 
revised and expanded the food stamp provisions, which eliminated the purchase 
requirement and simplified eligibility requirements. This provisional accommodation was 
in part the effects of bipartisan cooperation inspired by the changing of the old southern 
guard—which was brought on by the congressional reforms (Ernstes, Outlaw, and 
Knutson, 1997). Particularly, the food stamp provision was important to many 
congressional urban liberals. However, inner-city districts and farm districts were both 
outnumbered by suburbanites in Congress, thus without bipartisan cooperation of an 



























































































In addition, the surges in hearing activity in the early 1980s also resulted in the 
Food Security Act of 1985. As previously described throughout previous chapters, both 
the House and Senate Agriculture Committees during the early 1980s readily introduced 
bills and held hearings centered on addressing the adverse effects of the farm crisis. 
Particularly, agricultural policy was forced to the forefront of the federal budget debate 
(Cochrane and Runge, 1992). The primary result of such institutional activity directed 
Congress to curtail the crisis by trimming farm subsidies and stimulating farm exports. 
Although not due to a particular punctuating event, the small peak in hearing activity in 
1990 is also accompanied by the Minority Farmers Rights Act. This small rise in activity 
implicitly illustrates the suggestions by (Sheingate, 2001; Browne, 1995) that agricultural 
policy during the 101st Congress had come to mean more things to more people and as a 
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result was more inclusive. Taking this into consideration along with the increasing 
number of discrimination complaints might lead to one to say the soil of the agricultural 
agenda was fertile for the entrepreneurial efforts of Mike Espy, Wyche Fowler and The 




Agenda setting can at times be competitive and dynamic. Subsystems function in this 
process by restricting the number and variety of interests involved in policymaking, 
thereby limiting access to an otherwise pluralistic endeavor. However, depending upon 
the events that take place and or the participants seeking to institute change, policy 
equilibria can be disrupted. The level of congressional attention and debate given to 
agricultural policy of special concern to African American farmers is relatively limited 
over time. At the start of the mid 1970s (during the congressional reforms) and 
throughout the mid 1980s, (the era of the farm crisis) the level of activity peaks, but tails 
off by the late 1980s and reverts back to the status quo. Such change in activity is 
indicative of negative feedback as described by Baumgartner and Jones (1993).  
In addition, the policy monopoly secured by the Agriculture Committees in both 
chambers and the agricultural coalition that tends to dominate the policy debate, lends 
support to the presence of subsystem politics in the development of agricultural support 
policy. But, just as punctuating events resulted in an increase in hearing activity, such 
events also led to the accommodation of non-agricultural interests—particularly those 
connected with financial institutions and multination corporations. Yet it appears that 
125  
 
local activism, a growing number of discrimination complaints, the efforts of policy 
entrepreneurs, and the class action lawsuit brought against the USDA all worked together 
to open the door for civil rights advocates to explicitly debate agricultural policy in the 
context of civil rights. In part, the lawsuit in itself signaled a change in venue from the 
legislative domain to that of the judicial arena. This in essence marked a shift from 
seeking congressional attention to the hopeful beginning for judicial redress.  
In sum, the symbolic, yet under-funded step taken by Congress in 1990 with the 
Minority Farmers Rights Act was significant to black farmers, but the claims of 
discrimination continued to emerge; not to mention the reports indicating how African 
American farmers continued to decline (Wood and Gilbert, 2000). Particularly, the 
congressional gain made by black farmers in 1990 and the overall increase of the issue in 
1997 was in part the effects of the activities promulgated at a different venue level—the 
state and local level, and while problems continued to persist, the issue was taken to a 
third venue—the court. Thus, the next chapter seeks to highlight the group pressue that 
took place at the state and local level, the movement of the issue into the court, and why 


















The Last Toil for Redress 
 
 
    Justice delayed is justice denied 
     -Attributed to William E. Gladstone 
 
 
In the previous chapters I asserted the agenda of agricultural support policy was not 
conducive to the interests of black farmers over the post-war period. The preliminary 
evidence from the bill introductions indicate the agenda between civil rights and 
agriculture remain relatively disjointed in terms of policy content/description. Even 
though the apex of activity between both policy areas is similar, this similarity does not 
equate to policy coupling and subsequent legislation until 1990. Illustrating that prior to 
1990, dominant subsystem politics, antagonistic agricultural policy, and the effects of 
discrimination made it difficult for black farmers to succeed in the realm of agriculture. 
The policy monopoly maintained by the Agriculture Committees and the policy 
equilibria maintained by Congress were disrupted by both endogenous and exogenous 
events. The stimuli associated with these events produced change in hearing activity, as 
well as witness composition. Moreover, the periods in which hearing activity and witness 
composition varied, bill introductions varied also; suggesting that the stimuli brought 
forth a change in hearing activity and is plausibly responsible for the change in bill 
introductions.   
 The attempt in 1990 to inject civil rights into the discussion of agricultural policy 
was in part successfully accomplished through the energy and collaborative efforts of 
interests groups, policy entrepreneurs, and a changing agricultural agenda. This chapter 
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seeks to understand how energy was generated by group pressure at the state and local 
level. This discussion will illustrate how group pressure at the local level served as a 
venue for success in bringing forth change at the national level. However, in light of the 
limited success achieved on the congressional front and the continued complaints of 
discrimination, black farmers soon moved the issue to the venue of the courts. The 
chapter concludes by examining the Pigford v. Glickman lawsuit and the lingering 
remnants of the case.  
 
Groups Pressure the USDA 
While change slowly occurred at the congressional level, success would not have been 
realized without activism at the state and local level. Various church leaders, farming 
groups, individual actors, and civil rights and farming interests opposed the USDA’s 
discriminatory actions toward African American farmers. Borrowing a page from the 
1960s, protests, marches, sit-ins and speeches were all held in response to the USDA’s 
unfair treatment of the minority farming community. Just as the civil rights protests in 
Albany, Georgia and Birmingham, Alabama in the early 1960s increased attention to the 
inequality of minorities (Gilbert and Eli, 2000; Chong, 1991), black farmers also took 
similar measures to demonstrate their will to cultivate governmental action.   
The first of several actions occurred in 1981 when a group of approximately 25 
black individual farmers staged a 23-day sit-in at a local USDA office in Tipton County, 
Tennessee. The action was in support of black farmers who had been denied or delayed 
operating loans by local offices of the USDA. As important as the sit-in was to black 
farmers in Tennessee, it failed to initiate any governmental action. However, according to 
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the findings of the Civil Rights Commission, the 23-day sit-in proved to be warranted. 
Notably, the entrepreneurial actions of the Civil Rights Commission studied the problem 
in 1982, and indicated black farmers waited far longer for loan decisions and were more 
likely to be rejected for loans than their white counterparts. In addition, investigators also 
found 84% of white applicants had their loan applications approved, while only 56% of 
black applicants were granted approval (Mitall and Powell, 2000, 4). This discovery 
illustrated that the organizational culture of the USDA was indicative of what Wilson 
(1989, 76) describes as client politics. 
 The 1990s was an important decade for African American farmers. Not only did 
the Minority Farmers Rights Act emerge during this juncture, but as previously 
discussed, there were several congressional hearings held discussing the issue of 
discrimination and agricultural credit as well. During this dynamic era of the 1990s, black 
farmers refused to remain quiet; instead they continued to publicly protest their 
frustration with discrimination and land loss by black farmers, and the government’s 
unwillingness to address the issue. Brown (2003) suggests that during the 1990s, several 
black farm interest groups such as the Federation of Southern Cooperatives/Land 
Assistance Fund (FSC/LAF), the National Black Farmers Association (NBFA), and the 
Black Farmers an Agriculturalist Association (BFAA) were influential in orchestrating 
the protest rallies highlighting the discrimination by the USDA. 
 Probably the most active of these groups was the FSC/LAF. The FSC/LAF, which 
was originally known as the Federation of Southern Cooperatives forged in the early 
1960s during the Civil Rights Movement. The mission of the Federation was to protect 
and expand the landholdings of black farmers in the South, and to develop, advocate and 
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support public policies aimed at benefiting black and low income farmers in rural 
communities (http://www.federationsoutherncoop.com; Gilbert and Eli, 2000; 163). In 
1985 after merging with the Emergency Land Fund, a sister organization that also sought 
to protect black landownership, the new organization, called the Federation of Southern 
Cooperatives/Land Assistance Fund (FSC/LAF) was established.  
The NBFA and BFAA are also two influential groups that represent the interests 
of black farmers. The NBFA was founded in 1995 by president, John Boyd Jr. The 
mission of the organization is to eliminate and reverse the causes of land loss experienced 
by black farmers (www.blackfarmers.org/main.htm). Similar to the FSC/LAF, the NBFA 
advocates policies seek to improve access to agricultural credit for small-black farmers. 
Also forming in the mid-1990s was the BFAA. The BFAA is a non-profit organization 
that was established in 1997 to respond to the issues and concerns of black farmers in the 
U.S. and abroad (http://bfaa-us.org). In addition to advocating policies and programs 
aimed at strengthening the black farming community, the BFAA was also organized to 
monitor the USDA and the Pigford v. Glickman class action lawsuit. Overall, the mission 
and policy goals of the FSC/LAF, the NBFA, and the BFAA are the same—to protect, 
support, and strengthen the minority farming community. 
In September of 1992, the Federation of Southern Cooperatives/Land Assistance 
Fund (FSC/LAF) and several other black farmers organized a Caravan for Justice to 
Washington, DC. Activists marched and protested at the U.S. Capitol and at the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture in concern to the discrimination that continued to exist in the 
delivery of USDA programs (Smith and Hoff, 1997). Receiving little attention, black 
farmers remained steadfast and organized another rally four years later. On December 12, 
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1996, the National Black Farmers Association (NBFA), and the Federation of Southern 
Cooperatives/Land Assistance Fund (FSC/LAF) held marches and rallies at the USDA’s 
Jamie Whitten Building in Washington, D.C. (Wood and Gilbert, 2000, 58). The groups 
were protesting racial discrimination by the Farm Services Agency (FSA), which had 
recently consolidated two earlier agencies—the FmHA and the Agricultural Stabilization 
and Conservation Service (Wood and Gilbert, 2000, 58). Unlike previous demonstrations, 
this event received considerable media attention (Brewer, 2003, 14; Wood and Gilbert, 
2000, 58).  
In response, USDA Secretary of Agriculture Dan Glickman appointed a Civil 
Rights Action Team (CRAT) of USDA officials to hold “listening sessions” throughout 
the country to get input from the public—particularly minority farmers and USDA 
employees concerning civil rights issues facing the USDA in both program delivery and 
employment (Smith and Hoff, 1997). The eleven coast-to-coast listening sessions held by 
CRAT were well attended, but yet tumultuous and highly critical of the USDA’s program 
delivery (Brewer, 2003). Notably, Secretary Glickman or Deputy Secretary Richard E. 
Romancer attended all but one of the sessions; in part their attendance “gave the meetings 
elevated status and high visibility in order to counter previous negative publicity about 
USDA indifference (Browne, 2003, 145).  
On Friday, February 28, 1997, the CRAT released their report, entitled “Civil 
Rights at the U.S. Department of Agriculture.” The report stated, in part: 
Minority farmers have lost significant amounts of land and potential farm income 
as a result of discrimination by FSA programs and the programs of its predecessor 
agencies, ASCS and Amah. Socially disadvantaged and minority farmers said 
USDA is part of a conspiracy to take their land and look to USDA for some kind 





The CRAT came back to Washington criticizing the USDA’s Civil Rights Division for 
having a backlog of over 900 discrimination complaints (Civil Rights Action Team, 
1997). Several departmental officials asserted the backlog was due to staffing and 
funding issues, and constant reorganization of the civil rights office (Brewer, 2003). 
Despite the defense by departmental officials, Secretary Glickman sided with the report 
by the CRAT. As such, he admitted to the USDA’s long history of racial discrimination, 
and vowed to change the department (Wood and Gilbert, 2000, 59). As part of 
Glickman’s quest to institute change, he set a deadline of six months for implementation 
of the 92 recommendations contained in the CRAT’s report (Smith and Hoff, 1997). 
However, due to the increasing number of discrimination complaints, several black 
farmers, led by Timothy Pigford of North Carolina, filed a class-action lawsuit against 
the USDA in August of 1997 (Wood and Gilbert, 2000, 59).  
 
Order from the Court 
As previously indicated, the CRAT concluded that racial discrimination had been 
rampant throughout the USDA for many years. The report suggested the racial disparities 
in disapproval rates for loans and processing times, lack of diversity on county 
committees, and ineffective civil rights complaint system all plagued the USDA (Wood 
and Gilbert, 2000). When the USDA failed to implement its own 92 recommendations, 
African American farmers turned their attention to the Court in hopes of having their 
problems of discrimination addressed. 
 In 1997, thousands of black farmers consolidated their complaints against the 
USDA and filed the largest class-action lawsuit in history, Pigford & Brewington. v. Dan 
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Glickman, Secretary, the United States Department of Agriculture (Civil Action No. 97-
1978, PLF, and 98-1693, PLF) (Brewer, 2003; Wood and Gilbert, 1997). The lawsuit 
claimed the USDA had discriminated against black farmers in denying operating and 
disaster loans, and other forms of assistance between 1983 and 1997 (Browne, 2003, 
145). At the end of 1997, President Bill Clinton met with John Boyd, president of the 
National Black Farmers Association (NBFA), to seek a resolution of the class-action 
lawsuit. In response, Congress eventually passed a bill extending the statute of limitations 
in the case beyond the typical two years. Unfortunately no meaningful settlement ever 
materialized.  
Subsequently, in August of 1998, approximately 250 black farmers gathered in 
Alabama for the FSC/LAF’s 31st annual meeting (Rubinstein and Dookhun, 1998). The 
meeting announced plans for a pilgrimage to Washington, D.C. to support claims of 
discrimination and express frustration with the outcome of Boyd and Clinton’s meeting 
the previous year. In December of 1998, John Boyd and members of NBFA followed 
through with their plans by holding a march in front of the White House—complete with 
tractors and a mule. The protest marked the one-year anniversary of the farmer’s 
continual grass-roots battle against more than three decades of documented 
discrimination by the USDA and its employees (Smith, 1998).  
By mid-September, 1999, approximately 15,000 black farmers had joined the 
class-action settlement (Wood and Gilbert, 2000). On October 9, 1999, Judge Paul 
Friedman certified the Pigford class, allowing the case to carry forward as a class action 
lawsuit (www.ewg.org/reports/blackfarmers/part2.php). The major struggle in closing the 
case involved the structure of the potential settlement. Through the process of mediation, 
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involved parties debated whether to settle all of the farmers’ claims or structure the 
agreement solely on the basis of arbitration. After much debate and several extensions of 
the filing deadlines, the parties finally entered into a resolution for settling the case in 
1999. The dispute resolution mechanism formed involved a two-track process. Track A 
awarded $50,000 tax-free. This track was designed to provide quick limited relief for 
farmers with minimal documentary proof. Track B was an evidence-based proceeding to 
recover actual damage. This track was put in place to offer an abridged trial procedure for 
farmers who had an overwhelming degree of documentation supporting their claim of 
discrimination. This process was designed to take a maximum of approximately eight 
months, from claim submission to decision. Farmers choosing this track had the burden 
of proof criteria, “preponderance of the evidence,” in proving their case. On April 14, 
1999, Judge Paul Friedman signed the consent decree authorizing two separate tracks for 
redress (www.ewg.org/reports/blackfarmers/part2.php).   
 Not all were happy with the consent decree. Several class members, civil rights 
organizations and farmer organizations such as the FSC/LAF, NBFA, and the BFAA 
were clearly unhappy with the resolution mechanism. Overall, the Court received 
objections from 15 organizations and 27 individuals, including the two named 
plaintiffs—Timothy Pigford and Cecil Brewington. Complaints centered on the recovery 
amount, the structure of the resolution, and the lack of forward-looking relief. Farmers 
were concerned that the resolution did not look to explicitly address discrimination within 
the USDA. Notably, the USDA did not include any language in the consent decree 
indicating that all attempts would be made to prohibit discrimination in the future. As 
such, farmers were not only concerned with holding the USDA accountable of their 
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discriminatory actions, but they also wanted to institute change that would ultimately 
change the culture of the institution. Otherwise, farmers had reason to believe 
discrimination would persist. 
 The Court reviewed the objections and agreed the settlement was fair and 
efficient in addressing the farmer’s grievances. The Court’s reasoning for the amount 
awarded under Track A was that most farmers lacked sufficient evidence to prove their 
claims and “the settlement negotiated by the parties provides for relatively prompt 
recovery compared to a trial, where, it is unlikely any class member would have received 
any recovery for his injury for many years” (Pigford, 1999, 104-105). In essence, the 
Court embraced the idea it was better for farmers to have their grievances partially met, 
than not at all. With this in mind, Baum (1997) might ask the question whether the Court 
is more concerned with policy or legal clarity. It appears as though the Court’s rationale 
for upholding the decree was not exclusively an issue of legality, but rather an option to 
institute the most expeditious policy outcome. To buttress this point, the Court reasoned 
the settlement was fair because the “USDA is obligated to pay billions of dollars to 
African American farmers who have suffered discrimination and those billions of dollars 
will serve as a reminder to the Department of Agriculture that its actions were 
unacceptable and should serve to deter it from engaging in the same conduct in the 
future” (Pigford 1999, 111). Aside from banishing discrimination on legal grounds, the 
Court signaled its desire that the USDA institute policy aimed at addressing and 
curtailing further occurrences of discrimination. 
In examining Table 6.1, approximately 40% of the 21,982 farmers whose claims 
were reviewed under Track A were denied. Of the 182 who filed cases under Track B, 
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only 18 were awarded compensation. Moreover, there were an additional 72,000 claims 
that were not reviewed by arbitrators, because they were filed too late (Fears, 2004). 
After admitting guilt in 1999, five years later, the USDA is recanting its admission of 
discrimination by fervently contesting thousands of claims at all costs.  Again, the report 
by Environmental Working Group (EWG) concluded three quarters of the $2.3 billion 
agreed to in Pigford had not been paid, and almost nine out of every ten claimants had 
been denied, some on such technicalities as incorrect spelling. As of 2004, black farmers 
and their attorney James Myart, Jr. were granted a preliminary motion by a U.S. District 





























Table 6.1: Pigford v. Veneman: Consent Decree in Class Action Suit by African 
American Farmers: (As of July 9, 2003) 
 
Claims reviewed under consent decree 23,229 
Claims accepted by facilitator for 
processing in Track A 
21,982 
Information from USDA submitted to 
adjudicator  
21,782 
Information from USDA not yet submitted 
to adjudicator 
200 
Claims accepted by facilitator for 
processing in Track B 
182 
Claims rejected by facilitator for 
processing (not class member) 
1,065 
TRACK A:   
Adjudicator’s determinations completed 21,590 
Rulings against claimant 8,480 (39.3%) 
Rulings in favor of claimant 13,110 (60.7%) 
Eligible to receive $50,000 payment from 
Department of Justice 
12,995 
$50,000 payments made to claimant by 
Department of Justice: (Total amount paid) 
12,831 ($631,550,000) 
Claimants with loans identified for 
cancellation: (Total number of loans) 
1,307 (3,443) 
Claimants with loans identified for 
cancellation which still had a balance 
owed: (Total number of loans) 
221 (451) 
Claimants whose loans were cancelled: 
(Total amount cancelled) 
221 ($18,453,280) 
Claimants who received an offset refund: 
(Total amount refunded) 
61 ($206,227) 
Information documented from the United States Department of Agriculture: Pigford v. 









In 2002, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People 
(NAACP) held a conference in hopes of increasing political awareness of African 
American land loss.22 The conference which brought together black farmers and land 
owners, NAACP members from various state-level branches, agricultural extension 
agents, representatives from universities and state-level agricultural agencies and others, 
sought to raise public awareness and develop a course of action to stop the decline of 
African American land loss and to educate African American landowners of their rights 
(Black Issues in Higher Education, 2002). Items of importance discussed during the 
conference included the importance of building coalitions with various organizations, 
informing and educating black voters about land loss issues, and the importance of 
collaborating with historically black colleges and universities—considering their 
important role of training students for careers in agriculture (Black Issues in Higher 
Education, 2002).  
One might suggest that the conference held by the NAACP was an attempt to 
expand the civil rights coalition by appealing to the policy core beliefs of other 
organizations. Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1999, 122) state that policy core beliefs are 
inherently important to a coalition because they “represent basic normative and empirical 
comments within the domain of specialization of policy elites.” Considering policy core 
beliefs are less rigid and more flexible (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999, 122), 
coalitional expansion is more feasible, and as result influencing policy outputs is 
strengthened. Thus, the conference by the NAACP not only served to bolster awareness 
                                                 
22 The conference was held at Tuskegee University, which was titled, “Shadow Lands: Empowering the 
African American Farmer and African American Landowner.” The conference was sponsored by the 
NAACP as part of the organization’s voter empowerment agenda. 
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about the problems facing black farmers, but it also functioned as a strategy to spawn an 
advocacy coalition. 
In addition, in July of 2002, black farmers from Tennessee, Georgia, North 
Carolina, Oklahoma, Arkansas, Mississippi, and Alabama took part in a “Prayer Vigil 
and Non-Violent Sit-In” at the USDA’s Farm Services Agency (FSA) office in 
Brownsville, Tennessee (Muhammad, 2002). The five-day sit-in, similar to that held 
twenty-one years earlier in 1981, was in support of black farmers across the nation who 
had been discriminated against by the USDA. The main purpose of the sit-in was to 
attract public and media support, and ultimately congressional support for the 
establishment of a “separate but equal” lending agency specifically for African American 
farm borrowers (Muhammad, 2002). By attracting media attention, participants of the sit-
in attempted to revive issue salience on the public agenda and once again spur action at 
the congressional level. Dearings and Rogers (1996, 74-75) note that such efforts are 
important because they can impact the agenda setting process. For the most part, the 
majority of grassroots activity in the early 1980s was orchestrated primarily by the 
FSC/LAF, and by the mid to late-1990s groups such as NBFA and BFAA emerged to 
bring greater attention to the issue and to strengthen efforts of mobilization and group 








The pursuit for civil rights and justice for African American farmers has been a long 
contentious journey. Despite the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, black farmers 
continued to experience discrimination and inequality by the same agency intended to 
address their needs—the USDA. In 1862 when President Abraham Lincoln founded the 
USDA he called it the “peoples Department.” Unfortunately this motto did not always 
ring true for black farmers. Attempts to bring about policy change by influencing the 
agricultural agenda were hindered due to the work of American governing institutions 
and the politics of institution building (Browne 2003, 130). This exemplifies the “don’t 
let it happen” option of agenda setting, in which institutions function along side groups 
and participants who seek to limit particular problems from gaining institutional access 
(Ripley, 1985, 107). 
Currently the Court has become the primary venue for black farmers hoping to 
have their immediate needs addressed. After achieving short-term and limited success in 
Congress in 1990, farmers concluded the Court would be the institutional means for 
redressing the actions of the USDA, but considering the USDA’s avoidance of 
responsibility and the on-going process of the lawsuit, hopes for redress are indefinite. 
Therefore, as described by Rosenberg (1991), only time will tell whether a “dynamic 
view” of the Court is realized and ultimately maintained. As of today, the jury is still out 
concerning whether black farmers will truly receive their “40 acres and a mule,” which 










 “Institutions are typically designed to encourage  
 participation by certain groups and discourage  
participation by others.” 
     -Frank Baumgartner and Bryan Jones (2002, 24) 
 
 
I began this study with three objectives. First, is to understand how Congress governs the 
agenda of agricultural support policy over the post-war period. Second, to learn whether 
such governing is conducive to the interests of African American farmers, and third, to 
gain insight on whether the agenda of agricultural support policy ever intersected with 
civil rights. In seeking to accomplish these objectives, I have utilized three qualifiers: (1) 
congressional committees as the venue of focus, (2) bill introductions and (3) hearings as 
the measures of agenda status and governmental attention. Congressional committees 
were chosen because committees are the cornerstone of the political process, as well as 
the anchor for subsystem arrangements (Worsham, 2004; Fiorina, 1989). Thus, as most 
studies of agenda setting affirm, it is an appropriate venue to examine the political 
evolution of any policy (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993). 
So what does the research say about agenda setting, agricultural support policy, 
and African American farmers? First, the research confirms the observations of most 
scholars who assert agenda setting is a dynamic and inherently political process. In the 
case of my research, participants at the table of agenda setting are predominately those 
interests closely allied with the institutional venue in which the policy resides.  
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For example, the Agriculture Committees serve as the bastion for policy and the 
agricultural coalition that is accommodated tends to dominate the policy debate. As such, 
the agricultural coalition functions primarily as a “dominant coalition.” 
 Worsham (1998, 488) suggests, “policy produced in a dominant coalition setting 
favors select interests over the public interests.” As such, civil rights advocates were 
primarily on the outside looking in, when trying to influence the agenda. When the policy 
equilibria maintained by the dominant coalition is disrupted by punctuating events, the 
emergence of previously excluded interests enter the fray—particularly that of business 
interests. In addition, punctuating events also lead to the policy outcome (i.e. legislation) 
of 1977 and 1985. The Agriculture Committee in the House is most accommodating to 
civil rights advocates when the institutional level of attention concerning black farmers 
and discrimination are elevated. Likewise, the Minority Farmers Rights Act of 1990 
emerged as the result of policy entrepreneurs responding to local level complaints. Thus 
in part, not only do punctuating events serve as a catalyst for policy disequilibria, but the 
stimulus generated by interest group pressure is also a contributing factor. 
 Considering the aforementioned factors, is the agenda of agricultural support 
policy of special concern to African American farmers characteristic of a top-down or 
bottom-up approach to agenda setting? To claim the process of agenda setting operates 
solely in one direction would be an inaccurate assessment of most agenda setting studies. 
Rather, the process wavers and moves back and forth between both approaches. In doing 
so, the changes that occur can happen incrementally and in bursts, and when the bursts 
take place, the old ways of doing things are replaced by new organizational forms 
(Baumgartner and Jones, 1993, 235). Thus, when considering the occurrence of various 
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punctuating events, this process characterizes the agenda of agricultural support policy. 
Aside from the Minority Farmers Rights Act of 1990, the agenda of agricultural policy is 
rarely conducive to public interests—that of black farmers. This is primarily because the 
congressional management of the agenda and the majority of policy produced 
consistently reflected the values held by the dominant agricultural interests, and the 
relationship formed with allied interests. Notably, when change occurs from the 
collaboration of bottom-up interest group pressure and the actions of legislative 
entrepreneurs, negative feedback counterbalances the system, thus bringing the policy 
equilibrium back to the status quo. From this perspective, the agenda of agricultural 
support policy and the system in which it operates is characteristic of negative feedback 
as noted by Baumgartner and Jones (1993). 
 Aside from the approach that has been taken in this study, there are certainly other 
venues and perspectives to explore which would be useful for future research. For 
example, this research would have benefited from a detailed analysis of subcommittees. 
Considering the effects of the congressional reforms, this analysis would have helped 
highlight the influence that various subcommittees may have had on policy changes 
(Baumgartner and Jones, 1993, 202). In addition, examining the actions of the 
Congressional Black Caucus (CBC) in relation to policy-coupling and legislative 
entrepreneurs would illustrate the caucus’ attempts at challenging the agricultural 
subsystem. 
At the macro-level, an independent analysis of the USDA would be an ideal step 
for continued research. Examining agricultural policy through the lens of the USDA 
would provide a better understanding of the influence the department may or may not 
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have had on policy and the policy effects of interagency factions and politicking. In 
addition, taking a closer look at the presidency and the courts are also beneficial aspects 
to explore. While this analysis would further explore whether the actions of the president 
are linked to committee competition and efforts of issue redefinition, it would also 
explicitly assess whether decisions rendered by the court disrupt the turf monopoly 
maintained by the Agriculture Committees.   
At the micro-level, focusing exclusively on how agricultural agencies comply or 
fail to comply with programs and implement policies is also an area for further 
discussion. For instance, comparing the Farm Security Administration to that of the 
Farmers Home Administration would further illustrate how organizational culture can 
influence program delivery (see Wilson, 1989). Moreover, such a comparison would also 
highlight the complexities of a principal-agent relationship that have been noted by 
various scholars (Golden, 2000; Brehm and Gates, 1999; Mitnick 1984). Another 
direction for exploration could originate at the state and local level. Evaluating how state 
agricultural policies diffuse across states and influence federal dialogue is also an 
interesting area to build upon. Likewise, studying the influence of state government on 
the development, structure, and makeup of county committees would provide a thorough 
understanding of the implications of agricultural policy emanating from the devolution of 
power. In conclusion, the congressional approach utilized for this research is only a 
beginning step in exploring the dynamic evolution of agricultural support policy and the 
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APPENDIX A: House Agriculture Topic Matrix 
 
On the following pages, a matrix is used to illustrate the distribution of bill introductions in the House by 
topic for the selected analysis period. Although not shown, the topic matrix for the Senate is structured in 
the same format. 
 












1939     2
1940 1  1 2 1 2 1 1 22 3
1941 4 1 4 7 13 2 40 5
1942   1 1 4 1  11 3
1943 5  1 1 2 22 1
1944    2 4  5
1945 1   3  
1946     
1947     1
1948 1 1  2  
1949 2 3  2 4  1 1
1950     1
1951    1  1
1952  3  1  
1953 1   8  2 8
1954 1   1  4
1955 4  3 1  12 12
1956 1  1 2  7 18
1957 10 14 12 3 58 9  58 2
1958  4 1 49  13 8
1959 6 1 5 12 4  23
1960  5 42 10 11 22 3
1961  1  1 1 12 3 4 6 5
1962  11  7 3  5 3
1963  33 1 24 3 1 2
1964  1   1 2
1965  25  1 50 1 3 5
1966  8  1 2  6 5
1967  10  12 4 7 9
1968  1  2 1 16
1969  4 1 3 1 1  1 52
1970  14  2  10
1971  2 4 2 2 2 49
1972 2  2 2 1 1 2
1973   4 1 4 32
1974    2  3 15
1975  3 22 1 6 1 6 28
1976   8 4 6
1977  1 14 7 18 2 11 40
1978   10 1 1 23 1 1 11
1979  2 7 2 4 15 5 23
1980   3 1  35
1981  4 2 1 6 1 1 25
1982  4  1 2 1 1 23
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1983  11  3 5 1 1 12 20
1984    1  6
1985  8 1 1 1 12 43
1986  1 1 1 2 1 4 31
1987  7  1 3 4 1 2 40
1988  4  2  1 4
1989  1  1 7 1 2 5
1990  3  5 7 2 1 2 3 4
1991  1 1 4 1 10
1992  1  1 2 2 2 2 6
1993    1 2 2 1 5
1994  1  1  1 4
1995  2  1 1 2 1 2 3
1996  1  1  2 1
1997  1 1 2  1 1


































APPENDIX B:  House Committee Competition Matrix 
 
On the following pages, a matrix is used to illustrate the distribution of congressional agricultural hearings held in the House by each committee for the selected 
analysis period. Although not shown, the committee competition matrix for the Senate is structured in the same format. 
 
 


















Economic Energy Govt. 
Reform






1939 50% 50% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%  
1940 50% 25% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 13% 13% 0% 0%  
1941 33% 67% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%  
1942 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%  
1943 50% 50% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%  
1944 100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%  
1945 50% 25% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 25% 0% 0% 0% 0%  
1946 100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%  
1947 100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%  
1948 100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%  
1949 100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%  
1950 67% 33% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%  
1951 100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%  
1952 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%  
1953 57% 14% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 29% 0%  
1954 100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%  
1955 60% 20% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 20% 0%  
1956 91% 9% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%  
1957 100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%  
1958 100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%  
1959 100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%  
1960 100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%  
1961 100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%  
1962 100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%  
1963 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%  
1964 100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%  
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1965 67% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 33%  
1966 100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%  
1967 100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%  
1968 100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%  
1969 50% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 50% 0%  
1970 100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%  
1971 80% 0% 20% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%  
1972 100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%  
1973 33% 33% 0% 33% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%  
1974 100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%  
1975 75% 0% 0% 0% 13% 0% 0% 0% 0% 13% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%  
1976 29% 12% 6% 12% 6% 6% 12% 6% 0% 6% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 6%  
1977 81% 0% 0% 0% 6% 6% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 6% 0%  
1978 100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%  
1979 75% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 8% 0% 17% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%  
1980 80% 0% 0% 0% 10% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 10% 0%  
1981 87% 13% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%  
1982 78% 11% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 11% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%  
1983 59% 11% 0% 4% 0% 0% 0% 0% 4% 0% 0% 11% 0% 0% 0% 7% 0% 0% 4%  
1984 55% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 9% 0% 9% 0% 0% 0% 0% 18% 0% 9% 0%  
1985 28% 22% 0% 6% 6% 0% 0% 6% 0% 0% 0% 28% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 6% 0%  
1986 43% 21% 0% 0% 7% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 14% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 7% 7%  
1987 71% 7% 7% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 7% 0% 0% 0% 0% 7% 0%  
1988 78% 0% 0% 0% 22% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%  
1989 78% 11% 0% 11% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%  
1990 75% 8% 0% 8% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 8% 0% 0% 0%  
1991 88% 12% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%  
1992 50% 50% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%  
1993 67% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 33% 0% 0% 0%  
1994 100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%  
1995 100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%  
1996 50% 50% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%  
1997 100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%  
1998 75% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 25% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%  
        
 
APPENDIX C: House Coalitional Matrix 
 
On the following pages, is a matrix used to illustrate the witnesses present at the corresponding hearings for 




Year Agriculture Civil Rights Business 
1935 36 1 7 
1936 1 0 0 
1937 12 0 2 
1938 4 0 2 
1939 4 0 0 
1940 16 2 6 
1941 18 0 5 
1942 0 0 0 
1943 13 2 5 
1944 65 11 18 
1945 5 1 5 
1946 1 0 0 
1947 45 1 10 
1948 7 0 2 
1949 33 0 3 
1950 16 0 3 
1951 13 0 0 
1952 0 0 0 
1953 48 0 7 
1954 1 0 0 
1955 17 0 1 
1956 451 0 2 
1957 16 0 0 
1958 31 0 0 
1959 22 0 0 
1960 21 0 0 
1961 75 0 2 
1962 74 0 4 
1963 0 0 0 
1964 18 0 1 
1965 8 1 0 
1966 8 0 1 
1967 11 1 0 
1968 60 0 4 
1969 2 0 0 
1970 18 0 0 
1971 73 0 51 
1972 1 0 0 
1973 52 0 34 
1974 91 0 22 
1975 100 0 21 
1976 170 0 26 
1977 267 0 64 
1978 184 0 42 
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1979 321 0 61 
1980 93 0 41 
1981 126 0 41 
1982 171 0 31 
1983 164 0 77 
1984 232 9 50 
1985 289 1 100 
1986 66 0 27 
1987 112 0 48 
1988 15 0 12 
1989 142 0 17 
1990 237 16 43 
1991 125 0 48 
1992 11 0 5 
1993 35 0 9 
1994 171 0 32 
1995 301 0 60 
1996 9 0 12 
1997 5 10 24 
1998 7 0 5 
 
 
 
 
